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Abstract
Wireless sensor network is a fast growing area of research, receiving attention not only
within the computer science and electrical engineering communities, but also in relation to
network optimization, scheduling, risk and reliability analysis within industrial and system
engineering. The availability of micro-sensors and low-power wireless communications will
enable the deployment of densely distributed sensor/actuator networks. And an integration
of such system plays critical roles in many facets of human life ranging from intelligent
assistants in hospitals to manufacturing process, to rescue agents in large scale disaster
response, to sensor networks tracking environment phenomena, and others.
The sensor nodes will perform significant signal processing, computation, and network
self-configuration to achieve scalable, secure, robust and long-lived networks. More specif-
ically, sensor nodes will do local processing to reduce energy costs, and key exchanges to
ensure robust communications. These requirements pose interesting challenges for network-
ing research. The most important technical challenge arises from the development of an
integrated system which is 1)energy efficient because the system must be long-lived and op-
erate without manual intervention, 2)reliable for data communication and robust to attackers
because information security and system robustness are important in sensitive applications,
such as military.
Based on the above challenges, this dissertation provides Quality of Service (QoS) im-
plementation and evaluation for the wireless sensor networks. It includes the following 3
v
modules, 1) energy-efficient routing, 2) energy-efficient coverage, 3). communication secu-
rity. Energy-efficient routing combines the features of minimum energy consumption routing
protocols with minimum computational cost routing protocols. Energy-efficient coverage
provides on-demand sensing and measurement. Information security needs a security key
exchange scheme to ensure reliable and robust communication links. QoS evaluation metrics
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Wireless sensors are autonomous sensing devices with wireless communication capability
within short distance. A sensor node typically consists of a power unit, a sensing unit, a
processing unit, a storage unit, and a wireless transmitter/receiver (Akyildiz et al., 2002;
Kahn et al., 1999; Pottie and Kaiser, 2000). A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) contains
large number of sensor nodes (Akyildiz et al., 2002; Akkaya and Younis, 2005b) deployed
in controlled and safe environments (such as home, office, warehouse) or uncontrolled and
hostile environments (such as battlefields, toxic regions, et al.) and has wide applications in-
cluding military sensing and tracking, real-time traffic and pollution monitoring, and wildlife
monitoring, and so on.
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are self-organized ad-hoc networks whose nodes are
capable of sensing, gathering, processing and communicating data, especially the data per-
taining to the physical medium in which they are embedded. This enables sensing and
actuation at a fine grained level, both spatially and temporally. Though significant on their
own, wireless sensor networks play a central role in achieving the goal of truly ubiquitous
computing and smart environments. By interfacing the data collection and dissemination
1
infrastructure of WSN with external networks and devices, control and automation of phys-
ical entities like houses, factories, farms and so on can be achieved at a level that was not
possible before.
1.1 Resource Constrained Wireless Sensor Networks
Unlike traditional networked systems, a sensor network is constrained by finite on-board
battery power and limited network communication bandwidth. In addition, sensor networks
are spatially aware and are more closely linked to geographic locations and the physical envi-
ronments than centralized systems. A sensor node in a typical sensor network has a limited
battery, a microprocessor, and a small amount of memory for signal processing and task
scheduling (Akyildiz et al., 2002). Each node is equipped with one or more sensing devices,
such as sensors for visible or infrared light, changing magnetic field, electrical resistance,
acceleration or vibration, pH, humidity, or temperature; acoustic microphone arrays, and/or
video or still cameras.
One of the most important constraints on sensor nodes is the low power consumption
requirement. Sensors nodes carry limited, generally irreplaceable, power sources. There-
fore, while traditional networks QoS evaluation aims to achieve high provisioning or high
bandwidth, QoS evaluation of sensor network protocols must focus primarily on power con-
servation and security. They must have built-in trade-off mechanisms that give the end
user the options of prolonging network lifetime at the cost of lower throughput or higher
transmission delay.
Wireless devices must operate for a long period of time, relying on their battery power.
Although many developers have looked at extending the life of a wireless system from a
hardware point of view, such as directional antennas and improving battery life, energy
efficient algorithms are still a hot topic for wireless sensor networks.
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1.2 Vulnerable Wireless Sensor Networks
Usually sensors need to communicate with their neighboring sensors and base station, and
the messages between them may contain sensitive information. Thus, it is crucial to enable
encryption and authentication among sensor nodes to protect confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the communication and computation of a WSN. Some traditional key distri-
bution algorithms used for wired networks, or wireless mesh networks are not suitable for
WSN because of the unique properties of sensor networks, novel key distribution algorithms
must be further investigated. Therefore, QoS evaluation of sensor networks must also need
to focus on constructing secure communication links and obtaining confidential data.
It is challenging to secure WSN communications because of a WSN’s inherent characteris-
tics Camtepe and Yener (2005): (i) wireless nature of communication, (ii)resource limitation
on sensor nodes, (iii) very large and dense WSN, (iv) lack of fixed infrastructure, (v) un-
known network topology prior to deployment, (vi) high risk of physical attacks to unattended
sensors. Moreover, in some deployment scenarios sensor nodes need to operate under ad-
versarial conditions. The limited resources at sensor nodes rule out the use of public key
cryptosystems such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman key agreement to serve this purpose (Rivest
et al., 1978; Diffie and Hellman, 1976). A naive idea is to use a single shared key in the whole
WSN, but an adversary can easily obtain the key and decipher the message. Another way is
to customize public key cryptography and elliptic key cryptography for low-power devices,
which are still considered as costly due to their high processing requirements (Huang et al.,
2004; Malan et al., 2004).
However, these methods suffer from two major problems: high deployment density re-
quirement and the degradation of resilience against nodes capture (Zhou et al., 2005, 2006).
A more robust scheme is strongly needed for the resilience of wireless sensor networks under
limited resource constraints.
3
1.3 Contribution and Scope
This dissertation focuses on designing a stand-alone wireless sensor network for providing
QoS in terms of energy efficiency and robust communication. It primarily addresses three
issues related to QoS improvement and evaluation. Firstly, it addresses an energy efficient
routing protocol in sensor networks, where linear programming and heuristic optimization
algorithms are presented Secondly, it presents an energy efficient coverage algorithm, where
coverage and connectivity are considered at the same time to improve the system responsive
time and efficiency. Thirdly, a group key distribution scheme is proposed to construct reliable
and robust communication links between sensors.
1.3.1 Energy Efficient Routing
Energy efficient can be seen as one critical measure of QoS for wireless sensor network. Cur-
rent energy-aware protocols are mainly categorized into 1) minimum energy routing protocols
(Singh et al., 1998; Haque et al., 2005); 2) max-min routing protocols (Li et al., 2001b; Toh,
2001; Zhang and Mouftah, 2006); and 3) minimum cost routing protocols (Chang and Tas-
siulas, 1999, 2000; Zhang and Mouftah, 2006; Kalpakis et al., 2002). The minimum energy
routing protocols minimize total consumed energy to reach the destination thus minimizing
the unit energy consumption per packet. However, this protocol may not maximize the net-
work lifetime since the residual energy is not taken into account. Consequently, some nodes
on the minimum energy routes will easily fail due to the heavy forwarding load. The max-min
routing protocols, such as conditional max-min battery capacity routing (CMMBCR) (Toh,
2001), max-min zPmin (Li et al., 2001b) and MREP (Zhang and Mouftah, 2006), avoid this
problem by choosing a route that maximizes the minimal residual energy of some nodes in
this route. But these protocols add the overhead of control packets for the on-demand version
and it is difficult to decide the optimal threshold value that determines the operation modes.
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Besides the above three categories of energy-aware protocols, there are many other efforts
to extend the lifetime of a WSN. Linear programming (LP) formulations are proposed to
maximize the network lifetime (Chang and Tassiulas, 1999, 2000; Zussman and Segall, 2003;
Hou et al., 2005c; Kalpakis et al., 2002). Bhardwaj (Bhardwaj and Chandrakasan, 2002),
Sadagopan (Sadagopan and Krishnamachari, 2004) and Sankar (Sankar and Liu, 2004) de-
rive upper bounds on the lifetime of a sensor network that collects data from a targeted area
under the energy constrained situation.
Most of the above energy-aware protocols are based on the flat network or hierarchical
network and neglect the information that how the sensor nodes are deployed and distributed.
The geographic location information is easy to obtain due to the very nature of a WSN and
can be used to build routing algorithms to construct a scalable energy-saving communication
infrastructure. An advantage of geographic routing is its stateless and localized nature since
the packet forwarding depends only on the location information of the candidate nodes in
the vicinity and the destination node. Hence, the geographic routing is scalable because it
does not require additional control overhead.
In this dissertation, we present a two-layered sensor network model by incorporating
the geographic deployment knowledge of the network, based on which we propose a Hybrid
Energy-Efficient Routing Scheme (HERS) to extend the network lifetime by considering
the max-min residual energy routing and the min-max cost routing. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to develop the hybrid energy-efficient routing protocol while
minimizing the communication energy consumption using the nodes deployment knowledge.
1.3.2 Energy Efficient Coverage
Coverage is considered as the other measure of QoS of a sensor network. In coverage prob-
lems, the most significant factors are the ability of a network to observe a given area and
5
what are the changes that it detects in a given time frame. Energy-efficient sensing cov-
erage extends system lifetime by leveraging on the redundant deployment of sensor nodes
(Meguerdichian et al., 2001a). Within a couple of years, sensing coverage has become a well
studied subject which provides either full coverage in both time and space (Cardei et al.,
2005; Kumar et al., 2004; Tian and Georganas, 2003; Yan et al., 2003), coverage with guar-
anteed delay and connectivity (Cao et al., 2005; Hsin and Liu, 2004; Xing et al., 2005), or
guaranteed intruders detection within a certain stealth distance (Gui and Mohapatra, 2004;
Ren et al., 2005).
Effective coverage approaches for energy conservation in wireless sensor networks are
scheduling sleep intervals for extraneous nodes while the remaining nodes stay active to
provide continuous service. For the sensor network to operate successfully, the active nodes
must maintain both sensing coverage and network connectivity. Furthermore, the network
must be able to configure itself to any feasible degree of coverage and connectivity on a
proportion or whole of the specified area in order to support different applications and
environments with diverse requirements.
The work on sensing coverage can be broadly classified in terms of those that provide full
coverage (single coverage and multiple coverage) and those that provide partial coverage.
In full coverage, every point in the network is covered by at least one sensor. While such
coverage is desirable in sensitive environments such as military surveillance, it requires a
large number of sensors to be awake. In partial coverage, by contrast, only a subset of
points in the sensor network are covered and, hence, the number of sensors that need to
be awake is reduced. By degree of coverage, we mean the percentage of target area that is
covered by working sensor nodes. In particular, an algorithm for partial coverage is especially
desirable when it can provide a high degree of coverage while significantly increasing (more
than doubling) network lifetime compared to the algorithms that provide full coverage.
Full sensing coverage is mandatory for sensor monitoring applications that require either
6
immediate response to detected events or information of all points in the sensing field. Full
sensing coverage, however, is too expensive to support long-duration monitoring applications.
More often those applications do not need zero responsive time or information at all points
of the sensing field. Full sensing coverage provides over-qualified detection quality for these
applications at the cost of exhausting network energy rapidly, who may be willing to sacrifice
events detection probability or detection delay to some extent for increasing the network
lifetime. A relaxed sensing coverage − partial coverage, where the sensing field is partially
sensed by active sensors at any time − is a more appropriate approach to balancing intruders
detection quality and battery power consumption.
Meguerdichian (Meguerdichian et al., 2001a) uses Voronoi diagram to propose algorithms
in much favorable worst case running times scenarios in 2-D case. For identical nodes,
O(n log n + nk2) complexity by computing kth order voronoi diagram; for communication
range being changeable, runtime is O(n log n), which is much better than existing algorithms.
Connectivity affects the robustness and achievable throughput of communication in a sensor
network. CCP (Xing et al., 2005) provides geometric analysis of the fundamental relationship
between coverage and connectivity, and presents a Coverage Configuration Protocol (CCP)
that can dynamically configure the network to provide different feasible degrees of coverage
requested by applications. This flexibility allows the network to self-configure for a wide
range of applications and environments with diverse or changing coverage requirements.
Tian (Tian and Georganas, 2003) presents a 100% coverage algorithm by a node-scheduling
scheme based on off-duty eligibility rules, which allows nodes to turn themselves off as long
as the neighboring nodes can cover the area for them. Ye (Ye et al., 2003) achieves surveil-
lance coverage by a probing mechanism. In this solution, after a sleeping node wakes up,
it broadcasts a probing message within a certain range and waits for a reply. If no reply
is received within a timeout, it takes the responsibility of surveillance until it depletes its
energy. However, this probing-based approach has no guarantee on sensing coverage and
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blind points can occur.
A partial coverage scheme allows sensor nodes to periodically wake up and go back to
sleep. A node in sleep mode cannot sense events; its sensing capability is resumed after it
wakes up. Therefore, the sensor network provides only a fraction of the maximal coverage of
all the sensors. Battery power, however, is conserved for the nodes in sleep mode. Wang et
al. (Wang and Kulkarni, 2005; Ren et al., 2007) present a partial coverage algorithm pCover
for intruders detection by applying scheduling schemes. Gui et al. (Gui and Mohapatra,
2005) presents an on-demand coverage algorithm to track an intruder. In their work, the
sensor nodes only be activated to cover the path the intruder travels. However, in their
works, coverage degree problem is not considered or not fully addressed. Also, they assume
the network is connected well.
In this dissertation, we present the energy-aware on-demand coverage and connectivity
scheme for intruder tracking based on (Chen et al., 2001; Xing et al., 2005). We use the
algorithm of SPAN (Chen et al., 2001) to build a whole network backbone for data commu-
nication, and we adopt the idea of CCP (Xing et al., 2005) to maintain a dynamic coverage
degree on the area where the intruder presents, and do not consider other area. When the
intruder moves to a new area, the old active nodes will go to sleep, while the new nodes
which can cover the intruder will be activated to sense it and maintain a specified coverage
degree.
1.3.3 Reliable and Robust Communication Links
Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable and easy to be attacked and compromised. Security
and responsiveness to attacks are also an important measure of QoS. Currently, some pre-
distribution key cryptography schemes are presented to establish pairwise keys between
neighboring nodes in a hierarchical WSN (Perrig et al., 2002; Zhu et al., 2003; Perrig et al.,
2001). These schemes offer nice scalability due to the nature of the hierarchical architecture.
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However, they suffer from low resilience against nodes capture and high communication
cost. Consequently, it is impractical to deploy in large scale networks with limited energy
resources.
Other researchers present some key management schemes based on flat WSN. Random
pairwise key scheme provides very good key resilience below a threshold, and is more scalable
in the sense of efficient use of memory space of sensor nodes (Chan et al., 2003; Du et al.,
2004a; Eschenaer and Gligor, 2002). It is based on Erdös and Rényi’s random graph theory
(Erdös and Rényi, 1959). Each sensor node stores a random set pairwise keys to achieve
a probability p that two neighboring nodes are connected. If two nodes are not neighbors,
they can use intermediary nodes to establish a path key. To obtain proper resilience, this
scheme sacrifices key connectivity to decrease the storage usage. To further improve this
scheme, location-based random pairwise key schemes are proposed (Du et al., 2003; Liu and
Ning, 2003a,b; Liu et al., 2005), which take advantage of the location information to improve
the key connectivity. The basic idea is to have each sensor to share pairwise keys with its
closest neighbors. These schemes increase the resilience below a smaller threshold and incur
small communication overhead for key establishment.
However, these schemes suffer from two major problems: high deployment density re-
quirement and the degradation of resilience against nodes capture (Zhou et al., 2005, 2006).
In the recent schemes, GKE (Zhou et al., 2005, 2006)and PIKE (Chan and Perrig, 2005)
address the problem of high density requirement and obtain graceful resilience against nodes
capture. In GKE, or Group-based Key Establishment scheme, the network is divided into
small groups, and each sensor will be preloaded with unique pairwise keys shared with all
other sensors in the same group. GKE assumes all the other groups are the neighbors of a
randomly selected group, while is impractical, since one group should have at most eight geo-
graphically neighboring groups according to the groups definition and deployment. PIKE, or
Peer Intermediaries for Key Establishment scheme, is a class of key-establishment protocols
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that use one or more sensor nodes as trusted intermediary to facilitate key establishment.
Since the intermediaries may not always be in the vicinity, PIKE requires network-wide
communication to establish keys, which involves a relatively high communication overhead.
Here we propose Layered Group-based Key Establishment scheme (LGKE) to ensure the
secured communication between the sensor nodes in a dynamic large scalable wireless sensor
network. The sensor nodes are deployed in groups and each sensor node is preloaded with
unique pairwise keys that are shared with each other within the same group. We construct
the path keys via local communications for neighboring groups and build the keys via the
group heads and the base station for non-neighboring groups.
Furthermore, we extend the Exclusion Basic System (EBS) technique (Eltoweissy et al.,
2004) to achieve dynamic scalability. In a distributed environment, the existing EBS scheme
can only add/delete nodes one by one. For a system containing 10, 000 nodes, adding or
deleting one is trivial. While in our system, we can add/delete nodes as a group containing
100 to 500 nodes every time. Also, the base station can run an add/delete algorithm in real
time, which means groups can be added/deleted after being deployed. The scalability is a
compelling property of the LGKE scheme compared with other schemes.
1.4 Overview
Chapter 2 presents a two-layered sensor network model by incorporating the geographic de-
ployment knowledge of the network, based on which we propose a Hybrid Energy-Efficient
Routing Scheme (HERS) to extend the network lifetime by considering the max-min residual
energy routing and the min-max cost routing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work to develop the hybrid energy-efficient routing protocol while minimizing the communi-
cation energy consumption using the nodes deployment knowledge. Chapter 3 presents the
energy-aware on-demand coverage scheme. It only considers the interesting area and wakes
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the necessary nodes to cover it. Other nodes still remain sleep, which decreases the unnec-
essary energy consumption. Chapter 4 proposes Layered Group-based Key Establishment
scheme (LGKE) to ensure the secured communications between sensor nodes. The sensor
nodes are deployed in groups and each sensor node is preloaded with unique pairwise keys
that are shared with each other within the same group. We construct the path keys via
local communications for neighboring groups and build the keys via the group heads and the
base station for non-neighboring groups. Chapter 5 concludes the research presented in this
dissertation, and points out the avenues for further research.
11
Chapter 2
Energy Efficient Routing for Wireless
Sensor Networks
Transmission of data requires energy-aware QoS routing in order to ensure efficient usage
of the sensors and effective access to the gathered measurements. This chapter presents a
Hybrid Energy-Efficient QoS Routing Scheme (HERS) to extend the network lifetime by
considering the max-min residual energy routing and the min-max cost routing. The organi-
zation is as follows: Section 2.1 describes the proposed two-layered network architecture and
the deployment method. Section 2.2 provides the LP formulations of max-min residual en-
ergy and min-max cost optimization problems. Based on these, a hybrid energy-efficient QoS
routing algorithm is developed. Section 2.3 shows the simulation results and comparisons
with other similar protocols in terms of network lifetime. Finally, section 2.4 summarizes
the chapter.
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2.1 Network Architecture and Deployment Method
2.1.1 Scheme Architecture
It is critical to construct and maintain an efficient network topology. The sensor nodes in a
multi-hop WSN can collaborate with each other to determine their transmission power and
define the network topology through forming proper neighbor relations. This topology differs
from the ”traditional” network in which the nodes transmit with their maximal transmission
power without considering the power efficiency.
We define a two-layered architecture of a WSN as shown in Fig. 2.1, which is different
from traditional flat networks such as Fig. 2.2. In a flat network, the topology implicitly
depends on the geographic locations of the sensors and each node transmits with its maximal
transmission power. Although simple for small networks, this network architecture suffers
from scalability. For example, adding a new node needs to inform the whole network to set
up the keys for communication, which involves large communication energy consumption and
is infeasible for the WSN because of its intrinsic resource limitation. On the other hand, a
WSN is a scale free network (Barabási and Albert, 1999), in which there is a high probability
that a node links to a node that has already a large number of connections. This means
that for a group of sensor nodes, there could be one or two nodes that act as communicating
switches. Hence, in this paper, we use the cluster heads as the switches and propose a two-
payer WSN architecture Fig 2.1. The base station and cluster heads constitute a logical top
layer while other sensor nodes constitute a logical lower layer. This two-layered group-based
architecture assumption is reasonable and practical for the large-scale network. Each group
contains 3 nodes acting as cluster heads communicating with the base station. If two groups
are not neighbors, the sensors will communicate via cluster heads and the base station. More












Figure 2.1: Architecture of two-layered sensor network. The base station and cluster heads
constitute a logical top layer while other sensor nodes constitute a logical lower layer and is
divided into groups.              B a s e S t a t i o n S e n s i n g  N o d e  R e l a y i n g  N o d e I n a c t i v e   N o d e  C l u s s t e r  H e a d 
Figure 2.2: Traditional distributed sensor network without layers. The sensing nodes send
the information to the base station via the relaying nodes. The relaying nodes just forward
the information from their former nodes to their next nodes without processing it.
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2.1.2 Deployment Knowledge
There are many methods to deploy sensor networks (Zhou et al., 2005; Du et al., 2004b).
For example, an airplane can scatter sensor nodes over the battlefield. Based on the above
two-layered architecture and the geographic locations of the sensor nodes, we can partition
a large scale sensor network into groups. The following assumptions are made: 1) Nodes are
deployed randomly and the groups are allocated according to the geographic location. 2)
Once the sensor nodes are deployed, they are static. 3) the sensor nodes can be scattered
in the targeted area with a certain probability density function (pdf), e.g., the Gaussian
distribution, and a deployment point refers to the location where a sensor node is deployed.
In practice, sensor nodes are usually deployed in groups to realize a specified function,
e.g., in (Werner-Allen et al., 2005a). Sensor nodes are deployed in different groups and each
group is considered as a unit to sense temperature, acoustic pressure and seismic velocity.
In the paper, we adopt such a group-based deployment approach, assuming that the target
deployment region is a two-dimensional ma × na rectangular area. The target region is
divided into m × n equal-sized subregions Rij(i = 1, · · ·m, and j = 1, · · ·n) with each
subregion a × a square meters. Each group, Gij(i = 1, · · ·m; j = 1, · · ·n), is deployed to
the subregion Rij . Let N be the total number of sensors. The N sensors are uniformly
partitioned into N/g groups Gij with the number of sensors in each group equal to g, and
each group Gij is randomly deployed into the subregions Rij . The proposed deployment
scheme relaxes the assumptions in (Du et al., 2004b) so that subregions are predefined and
each sensor group is deployed into a specified subregion. Every sensor node k in group Gij
can be denoted as [(i, j), k ∈ N ]. The deployment knowledge can be obtained as follows:
1. Divide the target region into subregions Rij;
2. N sensor nodes are partitioned into groups Gij with g sensors in each group;
3. The node k in group Gij has an identifier [(i, j), k ∈ Gij ], and the distribution of the
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sensors in each group follows a pdf f(x, y|k ∈ Gij). A natural choice for the pdf is a two-
dimensional Gaussian distribution which can be easily extended to other distributions
such as the Weibull distribution or uniform distribution according to the application or
the actually distribution of the sensors. In Section 2.3 we will investigate the influence
of pdf on the maximal lifetime of the system;
4. Randomly distribute the groups Gij into the subregions Rij.
Since we model the sensor deployment distribution as a two-dimensional Gaussian distrib-
ution, the pdf for the sensor node k in the position µ = (x, y) is deployed in the group Gij
whose deployment coordination is (xi, yj). We have the probability density function:






where σ2 is the variance parameter of the Gaussian distribution.
An example is shown in Fig. 2.3, where the target deployment region is divided into 4 sub-
regions Rij(1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4). The N sensors are partitioned into 16 subgroups Gij(1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4),
with each group containing g nodes and 3 cluster heads as a whole, and uniformly distributed
into the sub-regions. In this deployment method, each group of sensors has eight randomly
determined adjacent groups, i.e., sensors in group G32 have neighbors either in group G22
or in groups G31, G22, G14, G11, G41, G13, G42, G34, and the sub-region Rij is a square with
the edge a× a. For simplicity, we assume each group has 8 neighbors and ignore the groups
locating at the edge and the corner of the targeted area, where they actually have 5 and 3
neighbor groups, respectively.
When the pdf f(x, y|k ∈ Gij) of sensor nodes in the sub region Rij is as in Eq. 2.1,
the probability that the sensor deployment point will be out of the range of the preferred
targeted sub-region is less than 0.03% if we empirically choose σ to ensure 6σ = a, where σ





Figure 2.3: Random Group-based Deployment Method. The left figure is the sub-region
structure, and the right figure shows the groups that are randomly arranged to the sub-
regions, and the indexes (1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4).
2.2 Maximization of the Lifetime of Network
A sensor network can be modeled as a directed graph G(N, L), where N is the set of all
nodes plus the base station, and L is the set of all directed links (i, j), i, j ∈ N . Link (i, j)
exists if and only if j ∈ Si, where Si is the set of all nodes that can be directly reached by
node i with a certain transmit power level in its dynamic range. SUBRt(g, e) represents
the directed subgraph of the tth group SRt, where g is the group size, or the number of
sensor nodes in the group SRt, e is the set of all the directed links (p, q), and 0 ≤ t ≤ N/g,
p, q ∈ n. The directed graph CB(M, CL) is the set of all cluster heads and the base station,
where M is the number of all the cluster heads and the base station, CL is the set of all
the directed links (x, y), x, y ∈ M . Let CH be the set of cluster heads. Each node has an
initial battery energy Ei. The transmission energy consumed at node i to transmit a data
unit to its neighboring node j is denoted by etij and the energy consumed by the receiver j
is denoted by erij .
There will be multiple commodities C in this network G(N, L), where a commodity is
defined as a group containing the source and destination nodes. For example, SUBRt(g, e)
can be seen as a commodity, and the source nodes are the sensing nodes which will send the
sensed information to the destination nodes. The destination nodes are the cluster heads,
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which receive the sensed information, process or relay it. Another example is CB(M, L),
where source nodes are the cluster heads and the destination node is the base station.
We assume that each sensor node generates one data packet per time unit, which is
termed as one round, and transmits the packet to the base station via intermediate nodes.
For simplicity, every packet has a fixed size of z bits. At each round, each function unit,
or group, will sense the necessary information and send it to the cluster heads for data
aggregation and processing; then, the cluster heads will send the extracted information to
the base station. The base station is assumed to be resource rich.
We define the system lifetime as the duration of time where all the function units perform
properly. We assume that all the groups have to coordinate with each other to perform their
designed functions. Hence, the lifetime of a WSN is equal to the time of the death of the
first group after time zero. In our model, when all the 3 cluster heads use up the energy, the
group will lose its function, and consequently, the system will die. The objective is to find
the most energy efficient algorithm that can maximize the lifetime of the network.
2.2.1 Energy Model
Our general energy model follows the first order radio model (Heinzelman et al., 2000a). The
energy expenditure per unit of information transmission from node i to j with the distance








where eT = eR = 50nJ/bit is the energy consumed in the transceiver circuitry at the trans-
mitter and the receiver respectively. The constant ǫamp = 100pJ/bit is the energy consumed
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coefficient at the output transmitter antenna for transmitting one meter. The distance ex-
ponent α ranges from 2 to 4, with 2 being a short distance and 4 a long distance. We
investigate the influence of α on the system’s lifetime in a later section. Notice that we
ignore the sensing energy consumption and computation energy consumption, because they
are much smaller than the communication consumption (1 : 10 ∼ 1 : 300)(Heinzelman et al.,
2000a).
2.2.2 General Energy Efficient Modeling
Let q
(c)
ij be the transmission rate of the commodity c from node i to node j, or a flow variable
indicating the flow that c sends to the base station over the link (i, j), and let q̄
(c)
ij be the





ij . Let CHt be the set of the cluster heads u, v, w in the t
th group SUBRt where
0 ≤ t ≤ N/g and u, v, w denote the 3 cluster head in the tth group. Let ri be the information
requirement of node i.
Based on the lifetime definition and the system model, the lifetime of the cluster head




































jk is the energy consumption including transmitting
and receiving consumptions per unit of time. Now the lifetime of our model can be defined
as the minimal maximal lifetime of the cluster heads in some group, i.e.:
Tsys = min max
k∈CHt
Tk(q), t ∈ 1, . . . , N/g (2.5)
The objective is to find the flow that maximizes the system lifetime under the flow
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conservation condition. Accordingly, the energy efficiency problem can be formulated into



































ij , ∀i ∈ c, i 6= j, ∀c ∈ C (2.9)
where N+1 means that we consider the base station as a packet receiver, but it is not thought
of as a sensor node. Eq.(2.7) conserves the feature that sensors have the ability to send
packets to other nodes. Eq. (2.8) means that any energy consumption in data sending and
receiving should respect the energy constraints. Eq. (2.9) means that every sensor generates
the same amount flow as it takes in. As long as the variable T in (2.6) is considered as
an independent variable, the above equations can be seen as a linear programming problem
(Chang and Tassiulas, 2000). The solution to the above LP problem gives energy-aware QoS
paths for the sensor nodes.
2.2.3 Energy Optimization Method
In this section we first present two traditional energy optimization routing algorithms for
the energy-efficient communications: one is to maximize the minimal residual energy routing
path (Li et al., 2001b; Toh, 2001; Zhang and Mouftah, 2006) and the other is to minimize
the maximal energy consuming path (Chang and Tassiulas, 1999, 2000; Zhang and Mouftah,
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2006). Then we provide our improved Hybrid Energy-efficient Routing Scheme (HERS) as
a comparison.
• Max-min Residual Energy Routing Scheme (MMRERS)
To extend the lifetime of the network, MMRERS selects a routing path that contains the
maximal residual energy among all the possible paths. This maximal residual energy routing
path is determined in quantity by the node whose residual energy is minimal along the path.
That is why the MMRERS is designed to address this max-min problem. Alternatively,
the purpose of MMRERS is to find the path and maximize its remaining energy at a low
communication overhead.
Initially,within the group SRt, where 0 ≤ t ≤ N/g, the set A contains only the cluster
heads u, v, w. Let SRt −A denote the set of sensor nodes in SRt that are not included in A.
We define the residual energy of a pair (i, j) as min(Er[i]− etij ∗ q̄
(k)
ij , Er[j]− erji ∗ q̄
(k)
ji ) where
i ∈ SRt −A and j ∈ A. Intuitively, on adding a directed link (i, j) to A, the residual energy
at the sensor node i is reduced by the energy consumed in transmitting a data packet from
i to j. Consequently, the residual energy of node j will be reduced by the energy consumed
in receiving a data packet. Among all pairs (i, j) such that i ∈ SRt − A and j ∈ A, the
procedure chooses one with the maximum residual energy and includes the link (i, j) in A.
The process is repeated until all sensor nodes in SRt are included in A, and for other groups,
the process will repeat in the same procedure.
For the top layer, a similar algorithm is adopted. Firstly, the set B contains only the
base station, and set CH denotes the set of cluster heads. We use the same definition of
residual energy, and add the maximal residual energy link (m, n) to the set B until all the
cluster heads are included in B.
• Min-max Link Energy Consuming Routing Scheme (MMLERS)
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To maximize the lifetime of a network, a direct method is to obtain a path which consumes
minimal energy in communication. Consequently, the goal of the design is to minimize the
energy depleting rate at individual nodes by selecting paths constituted by links with energy
as low as possible.
According to our network architecture, every group contains 3 cluster heads, denoted by
u, v, and w. Each cluster head needs to receive, process and transmit the information coming
from every non-cluster head node within the group, which would consume the energy denoted
by E. Therefore, in order to extend the lifetime T for each cluster head, our objective is
to minimize the maximum energy Emax consumed by each non-cluster head node within a
group. Let SRt, 0 ≤ t ≤ N/g, denote the tth group. The following is the linear programming
























































ik , ∀i ∈ SRt (2.12)
where i is a sensor node within the group SRt, and k is a cluster head in any other groups
except SRt where node i is in. For every group in the network G, the linear program
minimizes the maximum energy consumed by any sensor node of this group, subjecting to
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the energy constraint (2.11) and the flow constraint (2.12). Eq. (2.12) defines the flow
conservation condition, where flow in equals to flow out.
For the top layer max-min problem, all the cluster heads construct another group, denoted
by CH . It can be easily formulated in a similar linear equation format like Eqs. (2.6) - (2.9).
• Hybrid Energy-efficient Routing Scheme (HERS)
The MMRERS scheme suffers from the fact that the max-min residual energy links may
consume more communication energy. Under this condition, the system will use up its
energy soon and die. The MMLERS LP formulation can be solved polynomially by using
source-based algorithms, such as Dijkstra’s algorithm or Bellman-Ford algorithm (Ahuja
et al., 1993). However, its max-min paths usually contain nodes whose communication
consumption to other nodes is minimal or near to minimal. Therefore, these nodes have a
high probability to be selected by these optimal paths and run out of battery energy quickly
due to the heavy forwarding load while other nodes contain almost full battery energy. Thus,
the MMLERS is energy inefficient also.
In order to find a QoS path for sending data, we present the hybrid energy-efficient
routing scheme (HERS), which considers both the max-min residual energy as the link cost
and the min-max communication energy consumption. The minimum energy path will be
recalculated and redirected to other paths after every residual energy broadcast, and there-
fore, makes good use of all the possible nodes to construct optimal paths. Also, because
the algorithm runs within the divided groups, the death of a non-cluster head sensor node
won’t affect the lifetime of the rest of the network. Moreover, the complexity of the HERS
algorithm is low since it involves in the group size, denoted as g, and it considers the thresh-
old values of residual energies of cluster heads. Multiple cluster heads extend the system’s
lifetime also.
To further investigate the impacts of residual energy broadcasting on the network lifetime,
we adopt dynamic HERS, or D-HERS, which adjusts the broadcast interval, denoted by m,
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dynamically, and static HERS, or S-HERS, which uses a fix broadcast interval.
We denote Er[i] to be the residual energy at the sensor nodes i. Initially, Er[i] = E
for each node i in the network. We define the cost function costij that combines the unit
data transmission energy consumption etij and e
r
ji, initial energy Ei and Ej , and the residual






The link cost is denoted by the energy consumption from the sending node i to the
receiving node j. We use the exponent index β to emphasize that residual energy does have
impact. We will investigate the influence of the exponent index β on the system’s lifetime
in section 2.3.1.
The HERS algorithm, hence D-HERS and S-HERS which differ from each other by dif-
ferent residual energy broadcast policies, is describe as follows. HERS takes the deployment
knowledge of N sensors and initial energy in each sensor as inputs. Output is the system’s
lifetime. Let T be the system’s lifetime counted by the total rounds.
During the simulation, since each group resides within a relatively small region and
each contains only g nodes, we treat each group as a sensing unit which executes the same
functions. Thus, we take a random selection policy to select a node to act as an information
source that sends the information to the destination, or the cluster head along the optimal
path. After m rounds, another random selected node is selected as the source. Similarly,
another cluster head is randomly selected as the destination. For D-HERS, the broadcast
period m increments every p rounds, or time slots, where p is fixed value and is decided after
the network is deployed. If m reaches the predefined threshold, it will not change any more.
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Algorithm 1 HERS
1: Partition the N sensor network into t ⇐ ⌈N
g
⌉ groups gi, . . . , gt, such that each group has
g nodes and 3 cluster heads.
2: for each group, calculate the distances between each sensor node, and send the informa-
tion to the cluster heads.
3: for each cluster head, calculate the distance from other cluster heads in other groups.
4: let initial broadcast period m ⇐ 5 and lifetime T ⇐ 0.
5: if mod(T, m) == 0 then
6: for each group, broadcast the residual energy to every other node.
7: for each cluster head, broadcast the residual energy to other cluster heads.
8: for each group, calculate the shortest link cost paths from sensor nodes to cluster heads
using Eq. 2.13.
9: for each cluster head, calculate the shortest link cost paths to other cluster heads using
Eq. 2.13.
10: based on the new paths, for each group, send packages from sensors to cluster heads,
update the residual energy.
11: for each cluster head, send packages to other cluster heads and finally to the base
station, update the residual energy.
12: T ⇐ T + 1.
13: else
14: based on the old paths, for each group, send packages from sensors to cluster heads,
update the residual energy.
15: for each cluster head, send packages to other cluster heads and finally to the base
station, update the residual energy.
16: for each group
17: if the residual energy of all the 3 cluster heads less than a threshold then
18: return T.
19: else




2.3 Simulation and Results
In this section, we compare the performance of the HERS algorithm with three other al-
gorithms: the MLDA (maximum lifetime data gathering) and CMLDA (clustering-based
MLDA) which incorporate the MMRERS and MMLERS schemes and are proposed by
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(Kalpakis et al., 2002), and the LRS Leach (Heinzelman et al., 2000a; Lindsey and Raghaven-
dra, 2002) in terms of network lifetime, since they outperform other existing energy efficiency
schemes (Kalpakis et al., 2002).
We build the simulation environment by choosing a 50m× 50m target area and vary the
number of sensors in the network, i.e. the network size, N , excluding the cluster heads, from
40, 60, 80, to 100 respectively. Each group contains 10 non-cluster head sensor nodes and
3 cluster heads. Each sensor (including non-cluster heads or cluster heads) has an initial
energy of 1 unit and generates packets of size 1000 bits per round, which is consistent with
the settings in (Kalpakis et al., 2002). For the lower layer, each group has an optimal path
whose information source is a non-cluster-head sensor node, and destination a cluster head.
For the other nodes and cluster heads within this group, they all act as information relay
units and just forward the whole packets they receive to the next hop. If the next hop is
a cluster head which acts as the destination, it will process these packets and extract key
information and then forward them to the base station via other cluster heads. This is the
top layer’s communication scheme, see next paragraph. Here we assume the extraction ratio
is 1 : 10, which means in each round, a cluster head receives 1000 bits from the source node,
and the key information 100 bits are extracted and forwarded to the next hop.
As for the top layer, we use a similar scheme. Since N/g groups in the low layer has
N/g optimal paths, and therefore has N/g information destinations, which are considered as
information sources in the top layer, denoted by Pt, t ∈ 1, · · · , N/g. The destination is the
base station in the top layer. According to the extraction ratio, each path will transmit 100
bits to the base station. We process these transmission in queue in our simulation, although
in fact, these N/g sources may send information to the base station simultaneously. This
simplification will not affect the evaluation of the algorithms since practically the base station
will process incoming information in the queue, otherwise, information congest will occur.
The Bellman-Ford algorithm (Ahuja et al., 1993) is used to find the optimal path, and the
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Boost Graph Library (Siek et al., 2001) is used in our Matlab simulation code.
We assume the broadcast message contains 100 bits in this simulation. The base station is
located at location (25m, 150m), as (Kalpakis et al., 2002) set. We can use optimal position
selection techniques to locate the base station such as in (Pan et al., 2005b), but it is out of
our paper’s scope. The energy model for the sensors is based on the first order radio model
described in Eqs. 2.2 and 2.3.
We distribute the g sensor nodes and 3 cluster heads into each group according to the
Gaussian distribution, as shown in Fig. 2.4, where the total number of sensor is N = 40, and
group size is g = 10. Therefore, there are 4 groups and each group has a 25m×25m targeted
area. We also simulate the lifetime of the network based on the uniform distribution of the
sensor node in the targeted area when the network size N is 40. As shown in the Figs. 2.5,
2.6, and 2.7, the Gaussian distribution has a slightly better performance in the lifetime than
that of the uniform distribution.
Figure 2.4: Sensor Deployment in the Gaussian distribution. Here solid dots represent sensor
nodes and hollow circles represent cluster heads. In this target area 50m × 50m, 40 sensor
nodes are deployed and are divided into 4 groups, each group contains 3 cluster heads and
10 sensor nodes within the 25m× 25m targeted area. Within each sub region, the 10 sensor
nodes and 3 cluster heads are distributed in Gaussian distribution with the central point of
the sub region as mean point, the variance sigma is set to ensure that σ = 25m/6, under
this situation, the probability that the sensor nodes are out of the sub region is less than
0.03%, the cluster heads are deployed randomly.
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Figure 2.5: Rounds vs. lifetime for the Uniform distribution and the Gaussian distribution.
Here the network size is N = 40, and is divided into 4 groups, with each groups 10 nodes.
The distribution of the nodes will follow Fig. 2.4. Uniform distribution means within each
group, the nodes are distributed in the targeted area with even probability.
Exponent of Link Cost Metrics

























Figure 2.6: Exponent of Link Cost Metrics β vs. network lifetime. Here the network size is
N = 40, and is divided into 4 groups, with each groups 10 nodes. The distributions of the
nodes will follow Fig. 2.4. The broadcast period m is chosen to be 10. The key observation
is that when β = 5, the mean lifetime is relatively higher and variance is smaller.
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Exponent of Energy Equation



























Figure 2.7: Exponent of energy equation α vs. network lifetime. Here the network size is
N = 40, and is divided into 4 groups, with each groups 10 nodes, the distribution of the
nodes will follow Fig. 2.4. The broadcast period m is chosen to be 10, and the exponent β
is set as 5. When α changes from 2 to 3, the lifetime decreases dramatically.
2.3.1 Optimal Selection of Parameters
Since each node cannot know each other’s residual energy level, a periodic broadcast con-
taining the battery energy information should be sent to the neighbors. Obviously a smaller
interval will provide more accurate battery information but will also consume more commu-
nication energy and incur information congestion. A longer broadcast interval, on the other
hand, will consume less energy but leads to a non-optimal path selection. Fig. 2.5 shows
the tradeoff between the lifetime of the network and the residual energy broadcast interval.
The broadcast interval ranges from 5 to 23. When m = 19, the lifetime will approach to
its maximum, 11025, which is less than 16, 667, since the optimal lifetime obtained from
the MIP optimization is 16, 667. However, when the broadcast interval m increases, the
computation time increases. We choose the broadcast interval m = 10 for S-HERS in the
later discussion.
Fig. 2.6 shows the relation of the exponent index β in the link cost equation 2.13 with the
lifetime of the network when the network size is 40. As we can see, the Gaussian distribution
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has a better performance than the Uniform distribution, and the network has longer lifetime
when β is chosen between 3 to 5. We select β to be 5 since we want the ratio of initial energy
to residual energy to play a more significant role during the node selection, and when β = 5,
the system has a relatively higher mean lifetime and smaller variance.
Fig. 2.7 shows the impact of the exponent α in the energy equation 2.2-2.3 to the lifetime
of the network with the network size 40. When α increases from 2 to 3, the lifetime decreases
dramatically since the energy exponent change will incur changes exponentially. To compare
with (Kalpakis et al., 2002), the same energy exponent α = 2 is chosen.
2.3.2 Performance of HERS
In this section, we will compare the performance of HERS with CMLDA, a clustering-based
2-level hierarchical protocol proposed by Kalpakis, Dasgupta and Namjoshi (Kalpakis et al.,
2002), and LRS, a chain-based 3-level hierarchical protocol proposed by Lindsey, Raghaven-
dra and Sivalingam (Lindsey et al., 2001) since these protocols have the similar hierarchical
network structure and outperforms other protocols in terms of system lifetime. More details
about the protocols can be found in (Lindsey et al., 2001), (Lindsey and Raghavendra, 2002)
and (Kalpakis et al., 2002).
Table 2.1 is based on the fixed broadcast interval m = 10 for S-HERS, β = 5 and α = 2,
Table 2.1: Simulation results for a 50m × 50m sensor network
N S-HERS D-HERS MLDA CMLDA LRS
40 8529 8529 6610 6512 5592
60 7912 8468 7174 7084 5872
80 7397 8471 7945 7809 6002
100 6804 8545 8290 8121 5526
S-HERS broadcast interval m = 10
D-HERS Broadcast interval m = 10 for N = 40, m = 12 for N = 60, m = 14 for N = 80, m = 16 for
N = 100
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for D-HERS, Broadcast intervals are chosen as m = 10 for N = 40, m = 12 for N = 60,
m = 14 for N = 80, m = 16 for N = 100 separately. Some key observations can be obtained
as follows.
The lifetime of a network obtained using the static broadcast interval (S-HERS) decreases
when the network size increases. It is inferior to MLDA and CMLDA when network size
is 80 or more, since when the network size increases, the number of the groups increases.
Therefore, the communication within the top layer consumes more energy. S-HERS performs
1.10-1.31 times better than MLDA and CMLDA with a smaller network size. The lifetime
obtained using S-HERS is significantly longer than that of LRS for all the network sizes,
which is 1.23-1.53 times better than LRS.
D-HERS outperforms MLDA, CMLDA, and LRS at a relatively stable level of about
8500. The lifetime of the network using D-HERS is about 1.03-1.29 times longer than that
of MLDA and CMLDA, and about 1.50 times longer than that of LRS.
Next we conduct a series of experiments with larger network sizes. The sensors are
deployed in a 100m × 100m area with Gaussian distribution. The network size, N , varies
from 100 to 500. Each sensor has an initial energy 1J , and the base station is located at
(50, 300). Each group has 10 sensor nodes. All the settings are the same as (Kalpakis et al.,
2002). In this series experiments, we adopt D-HERS scheme since D-HERS has a better
performance than S-HERS in large scale networks. The results are shown in Table 2.2. As
we can see, D-HERS has a stable lifetime level about 7200, which is about 1.5 times longer
than that of CMLDA, and about 2.5 times longer than that of LRS.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a new energy-aware QoS routing protocol for sensor networks.
We apply the deployment model to a two-layered sensor network, provide a general linear
31
Table 2.2: Simulation results for a 100m × 100m sensor network
N D-HERS CMLDA LRS
100 7212 3611 2458
200 7106 4512 2854
300 7535 5560 3212
400 7468 6142 3654
500 7194 6577 3596
programming formulation for the network lifetime maximization problem, and present our
heuristics algorithms S-HERS and D-HERS to achieve an optimal network lifetime by finding
the QoS paths for every sending node i to receiving node j. The simulation results showed
that 1) for a small scale sensor network, the S-HERS can achieve network lifetime 1.1 − 1.3
times better than other existing protocols; 2) for any size network, the D-HERS can obtain
a factor of 1.1 − 2.0 increase in network lifetime when compared to the same protocols; 3)
the Gaussian distribution performs 1.20 times better than uniform distribution does.
We consider only a relatively large network size for computing the QoS routing in a
distributed manner. However, in practical, there might be extremely large scale sensor net-
works, see, ≥ 10, 000. Our HERS algorithms based on a two-layered network have high
complexity. A solution to decrease the computation complexity is to divide the network into
more layers. The nodes number of each layer is confined in a specified range. Also, the
algorithms presented are based on a centralized environment. However, a decentralized algo-
rithm will be more practical since every node will make decisions based on the information
it can obtain from its neighbors. These will be my next research topics.
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Chapter 3
Energy Efficient Coverage for
Wireless Sensor Networks
3.1 Introduction
Acquisition of data requires energy-aware QoS coverage and connectivity in order to ensure
efficient coverage of the targets and effective data transmission for energy saving. In this
chapter, we present the energy-aware QoS coverage and connectivity scheme for intruder
tracking, as shown in Figure 3.1. The algorithm of SPAN (Chen et al., 2001) is used to build
the network connectivity backbone for data communication. And CCP (Xing et al., 2005)






Figure 3.1: On-demand Tracking
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This chapter is organized as follows: section 2 will briefly introduce the SPAN (Chen
et al., 2001) algorithm of build communication backbones, section 3 addresses Coverage
Configuration Protocol (Xing et al., 2005), the theoretic foundationary of our revised method
to maintain coverage degree, section 4 will introduce our prediction model, section 5 will
present our on-demand algorithm for intruders tracking, firstly single intruder algorithm is
introduced, then an improved algorithm for multi-intruder detection algorithm is presented;
section 6 will give the simulation settings and results, finally we give our summary.
3.2 Building Communication Backbones
SPAN (Chen et al., 2001) is a power saving technique for multi-hop ad hoc wireless networks
that reduces energy consumption without significantly diminishing the capacity or connec-
tivity of the network. SPAN builds on the observation that when a region of a shared-channel
wireless network has a sufficient density of nodes, only a small number of them need be on
at any time to forward traffic for active connections. It makes periodic local decisions on
whether to sleep, or to join a forwarding backbone as a coordinator and participate in the
forwarding backbone topology.
To build and maintain backbones, SPAN combines two basic algorithms: coordinator
eligibility rule and coordinator withdrawal rule. According to the coordinator eligibility rule,
a non-coordinator node should become a coordinator if it discovers, using only information
gathered from local broadcast messages, that two of its neighbors cannot reach each other
either directly or via one or two coordinators. This election algorithm does not yield the
minimum number of coordinators required to merely maintain connectedness. However, it
roughly ensures that every populated radio range in the entire network contains at least one
coordinator. Also, nodes with more energy should volunteer as a coordinator more quickly.
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SPAN also implements coordinator withdrawal rule. According to the rule, each coor-
dinator periodically checks if it should withdraw. If every pair of its neighbors can reach
other either directly or via some other coordinators or neighbors, the coordinator should
withdraw to save energy consumption. In order to also rotate the coordinators among all
nodes fairly, after a node has been a coordinator for some period of time, it marks itself
as a tentative coordinator if every pair of neighbor nodes can reach each other via one or
two other neighbors, even if those neighbors are not currently coordinators. A tentative
coordinator can still be used to forward packets. However, the coordinator announcement
algorithm treats a tentative coordinator as a non-coordinator. Thus, by marking itself as
tentative, a coordinator gives its neighbors a chance to become coordinators.
SPAN improves 802.11 ad hoc power-saving mode to save energy and decrease packet
delivery latency. To ensure that SPAN does not provide incorrect information because of
topology changing, the MAC maintains a separate neighbor table. The MAC adds one bit
to the MAC header of each packet to notify neighbors of its power saving status. SPAN
modifies the MAC so each broadcast message must be explicitly advertised because most
traffic in SPAN would be broadcast messages. SPAN also introduces a new small advertised
traffic window in the MAC to allow a node in power saving mode to turn itself off at the end
of the advertised traffic window until the next beacon period. A more detailed introduction
about SPAN can be referred to (Chen et al., 2001).
3.3 Coverage Configuration Protocol
For the sensor network to operate successfully, the active nodes must maintain both sensing
coverage and network connectivity. Furthermore, the network must be able to configure itself
to any feasible degree of coverage and connectivity in order to support different applications
and environments with diverse requirements. We implement our on-demand coverage scheme
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based on CCP (Xing et al., 2005). A more detailed introduction about CCP can be referred
to (Xing et al., 2005), here we only present the important theorems about coverage and
connectivity.
Theorem 3.3.1. For a set of sensors that at least 1-cover a convex region A, the commu-
nication graph is connected if Rc ≥ 2Rs.
Theorem 3.3.1 is the corresponding Theorem 1 in (Xing et al., 2005), where Rc is the sen-
sor’s communication radius and Rs is the sensor’s sensing radius. Theorem 3.3.1 establishes
a sufficient condition for a 1-covered network to guarantee 1-connectivity.
Theorem 3.3.2. For a set of nodes Ks-cover a convex region A forms a Ks connected
communication graph if Rc ≥ 2Rs.
Theorem 3.3.2 is the corresponding Theorem 2 in (Xing et al., 2005), where Ks is the
desired coverage degree. Theorem 3.3.2 builds a relationship between the degree of coverage
and connectivity. This result is important for applications that require degree of coverage of
connectivity larger than one.
Based on the theorems 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, Wang et. al.(Xing et al., 2005) present coverage
configuration protocol if Rc ≥ 2Rs. Each node executes an eligibility algorithm to determine
whether it is necessary to become active or not. Given a requested coverage degree Ks, a
node is ineligible if every location within its coverage range is already Ks-covered by other
active nodes in its neighborhood. For example, assume the nodes covering the shaded circles
in Figure 3.2 are active, the node with the bold sensing circle is ineligible to be activated for
Ks = 1, but eligible for Ks > 1.
Before presenting the eligibility algorithm, we defined the following notations.
1. A point p ∈ coverage region A is called an intersection point between nodes u and v,
that is, p ∈ u ∩ v, if p is an intersection point of the sensing circles of u and v.;
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Figure 3.2: Ks Coverage. An example of 1-coverage eligibility. The node with the bold
sensing circle is ineligible since every point in its sensing range is covered by other nodes.
2. A point p on the boundary of the coverage region A is called an intersection point
between node v and A, that is, p ∈ v ∩ A if |pv| = Rs, where Rs is the sensing range
of nodes v and u.
Theorem 3.3.3. A convex region A is Ks-covered by a set of nodes if (1) there exist in region
A intersection points between nodes or between nodes and A’s boundary; (2) all intersection
points between any nodes are at least Ks-covered; and (3) all intersections points between
any node and A’s boundary are at least Ks-covered.
Theorem 3.3.3 is the corresponding Theorem 4 in (Xing et al., 2005). According to this
theorem, we can transform the problem of determining the coverage degree of a region to
the simpler problem of determining the coverage degrees of all the intersection points in the
same region. A node is ineligible for turning active if all the intersection points inside its
sensing circle are at least Ks-covered. To find all the intersection points inside its sensing
circle, a node v needs to consider all the nodes in its sensing neighbor set, SN(v). SN(v)
includes all the active nodes whose sensing circles intersect the sensing circle of v, that is,
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SN(v) = {active node u}, where |uv| < 2 ∗Rs, u 6= v. If there is no intersection point inside
the sensing circle of node v, v is ineligible when there are Ks or more nodes that are located
at node v′s position.
3.4 Prediction Model
In order not to lose the track of intruders, some nodes in the future path of intruders need to
be activated in advance. Also, some nodes which are sensing the intruders need to set a time
to sleep for energy saving if the future positions of the intruders are not within the nodes’
sensing range any more. Here we present a linear prediction model to roughly estimate the
future positions of the objects. Some more accurate but complicated prediction models, such
as ARIMA (Box and Jenkins, 1991; Li et al., 2006), are presented. However, considering the
limited computation ability and resource constraints of sensor nodes, we adopt this simple
but efficient model instead. Figure 3.3 A shows actual movement of the intruder (solid curve)
and the predicted position (arrow head) using linear prediction model. As long as we set a
proper time span, the curve can be approached by some piecewise lines.
As shown in Fig. 3.3-A, we know the previous position of an intruder (x1, y1), the current
intruder’s position (x2, y2), we can get the future position (x3, y3) using Eq. 3.1
x3 = 2 ∗ x2 − x1
y3 = 2 ∗ y2 − y1 (3.1)
Eq. 3.1 means the time span of sampling (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) is the same as the time
span of sampling (x2, y2) and (x3, y3), and the intruder will not make a weird movement,
such as turning around suddenly, and continue moving at the old direction.
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Figure 3.3: Prediction Model.
3.4.1 Activation in Advance
To track a fast moving intruder, node v needs to be activated in advance in order not to losing
the tracking. We will broadcast an activation packet in advance containing the intruder’s
future position if the intruder runs out of node v′s sensing range. As shown in Figure 3.4,
node v knows its central position (x1, y1), and the intruder’s current position (x2, y2), which
is out of node v′s sensing range Rs, and the intruder’s future position (x3, y3), which is
within its sensing range. Node v needs to determine a delay time tda. After tda, node v will
be activated. We use the distance of d1/cos(α) to estimate the actual distance the intruder
needs to go from its current position, where α is the angel between the line (x1, y1)(x2, y2)
and the line (x2, y2)(x3, y3) and can be calculated by simply geometry knowledge. The node
knows the speed p the intruder moves at. Therefore, we have the delay time in Eq. 3.2.
tdelay = (||(x1, y1)(x2, y2)|| − Rs)/(cos(α) ∗ speed) (3.2)
To avoid the situation that more than one nodes have the same delay time to be activated
and then violate the coverage degree maintenance, we add a random time tr to the delay
time. Finally tda is calculated in Eq. 3.3.
tda = tdelay + tr (3.3)
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Figure 3.4: Prediction Model in Activation
3.4.2 Deactivation for Energy Saving
When the intruders move out of node v′s sensing range, node v needs to arrange a delay
time to be deactivated and go to sleep. As shown in Figure 3.5, node v knows its central
position (x1, y1), and the intruder’s current position (x2, y2), which is within node v
′s sensing
range Rs, and the intruder’s future position (x3, y3), which is out of v
′s sensing range. Node
v needs to determine a delay time tdd. After tdd, node v will be deactivated. Using the
similar method in Section 3.4.1, we estimate the distance that the intruder needs to go out
of node v′s sensing range as ||(x2, y2)(x3, y3)|| − d1/cos(α), where α is the angel between the
line (x1, y1)(x2, y2) and the line (x2, y2)(x3, y3) and can be calculated by simply geometry
knowledge. And d1 = ||(x1, y1)(x3, y3)|| − Rs. Therefore, we have the delay time tdd is:
tdd = (||(x2, y2)(x3, y3)|| − d1/cos(α))/(speed) + tr (3.4)
where tr is a random time, which is added to avoid that more than two nodes are deactivated
at the same time. At that situation, the coverage degree maintenance is violated.
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Figure 3.5: Prediction Model in Deactivation
3.5 On-demand Algorithm Implementation
Our algorithm includes communication backbones construction, local coverage maintenance,
intruder track and data report. Since the communication backbone algorithm is based on
SPAN (Chen et al., 2001) and introduced in section 3.2, we will skip it and focus on the
last three parts in detail. Firstly a single intruder detection algorithm is introduced, and
followed by an improved multiple intruders detection algorithm.
3.5.1 Single Intruder Detection Algorithm
This algorithm directly uses the prediction model introduced in Section 3.4, and includes
coverage degree maintenance algorithms and intruder tracking.
Firstly we need to check the coverage degree for each sensor. As introduced in Section
3.3, to obtain the coverage degree of each sensor. We only need to check the coverage degree
of the intersection points within its sensing range.
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Check Coverage
Algorithm 2 is the pseudo-code to run in every node, or in node u.
Algorithm 2 intersection-calculation
1: for all nodes v, and v 6= u do




6: for all nodes v, w ∈ neiborlist do
7: calculate-intersection(v, w, sec)




12: for all nodes v ∈ neiborlist do
13: bound-intersection(v,sec)





Every node u has a neighborhood list called neiborlist which stores u′s neighbors who
have intersection points with u. Every node u has also an intersection points list called seclist,
which stores the intersection points between u′s neighbors, or u′s neighbors and boundary.
Every intersection point s has a member called msr representing its current coverage
degree. Algorithm 3 is the pseudo-code to check coverage degree. Node u knows the position
p of the intruder, and p is in u′s sensing range, otherwise u will not run the algorithm.
Algorithm 3 check-coverage
1: for all s ∈ seclist do






Return 1 means the coverage degree is less than ks, and node u needs to be activated.
Return 0 means the intruder is already ks-covered, node u needs to do nothing.
Coverage Degree Updating
Whenever a node v is activated or deactivated, the coverage degree of the intersection points
within v′s sensing range will change correspondingly. However, v′s neighbors do not know
the coverage degree changes, so the node v needs to send packets to its neighbors about its
status change. For example, node u receives a packet from node v indicating node v′s status
is changed. Algorithm 4 is the pseudo-code to update node u′s coverage degree.
Algorithm 4 update-coverage
1: for all sec ∈ seclist do
2: if ‖sec, u‖ ≤ Rs && ‖sec, v‖ ≤ Rs then
3: if v is activated then
4: sec.msr ++
5: end if
6: if v is deactivated then
7: sec.msr - -
8: if sec.msr≤ 0 then






Here we introduce the whole picture of our single intruder tracking algorithm. Every node,
i.e., u will periodically check the position of the intruder, and based on this information,
u will do some operations such as making predictions, becoming activated or deactivated.





2: if ‖p, u‖ ≤ Rs && -is-sensing then
3: get-future-position(f)
4: if ‖f, u‖ ≥ Rs then
5: get-deactivation-delay(dd)
6: after dd, go to sleep
7: send packets to every neighbor v, v ∈ neiborlist
8: -is-sensing = false
9: end if
10: else if ‖p, u‖ ≤ Rs && !-is-sensing && check-coverage() then
11: get-activation-delay(da)
12: after da, wake up
13: send packets to every neighbor v, v ∈ neiborlist
14: -is-sensing = true
15: else if ‖p, u‖ ≥ Rs && -is-sensing &&!-is-coordinator then
16: get-deactivation-delay(dd)
17: after dd, go to sleep
18: send packets to every neighbor v, v ∈ neiborlist
19: -is-sensing = false
20: else
21: get-future-position(f)
22: if ‖f, u‖ ≤ Rs then
23: get-activation-delay(da)
24: after da, wake up
25: send packets to every neighbor v, v ∈ neiborlist
26: -is-sensing = true
27: end if
28: end if
For the current intruder’s position p, every node u has four kinds of conditions: 1). u
is activated and the intruder is within u′s sensing range. In this case, sensor u predicts the
intruder’s next possible position f , if f is out of sensor u′s sensing range, sensor u calculates
its delay time dd. After time dd, sensor u will go to sleep. 2). sensor u is not activated, if
the coverage degree ≤ ks, then sensor u calculates a delay time da, after time da, sensor u
is activated. 3). u is activated but the intruder is out of u′s sensing range, and the intruder
is within u′s sensing range, then sensor u calculates a delay time dd, after time dd, sensor u
will go to sleep. 4). sensor u is not activated and the intruder is out of u′s sensing range. In
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this case, sensor u predicts the intruder’s next possible position f , if f is within sensor u′s
sensing range, sensor u calculates its delay time da. After time da, sensor u will be activated.
Note that NS2 has an internal timer to handle the delay time. When the delay time
eclipses, NS2 automatically calls functions to activate or deactivate the corresponding sensor.
3.5.2 Multiple Intruders Detection Algorithm
This algorithm involves in more sensor nodes’ cooperation since the intruders may enter the
sensor network from different positions. For example, in single intruder detection algorithm,
if the intruder i1 moves out of one non-coordinator sensor’s (n1) sensing range and will not
return back based on the prediction model, n1 will go back to sleep. However, for multiple
intruders detection algorithm, n1 may be monitoring another intruder i2 and will last for
some time. In this case, simply let n1 sleep will violate the coverage degree of i2. Thus we
need to adjust the corresponding algorithms for coverage degree maintenance and intruder
tracking. Also, in the intruder tracking algorithm, some data specifying the intruders must
be added to the transferred packages from the sensor n1 to the base station for identification,
otherwise the base station cannot distinguish the intruders. Note that all these adjustments
increase the energy consumption for this sensor network.
For simplicity, we assume the coverage degree for every intruder is the same. As discussed
in section 3.5.1, we do not need to change the algorithms for coverage checking, coverage
maintaining and coverage updating, the only changed algorithm is the whole picture of
intruder tracking algorithm.
Intruder Tracking
As we said above, if a sensor u is monitoring more than one intruders at the same time,
and one intruder moves out of u′s sensing range, the sensor u cannot go to sleep since it is
monitoring other intruders. In this situation, the intruders tracking algorithm is changed
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correspondingly.
Every node periodically scans its sensing range to check whether there are intruders
within its sensing range, and based on this information, it will do some operations such as
making predictions and becoming activated or deactivated. Variable denoted as -is-sensing
indicates that node u is activated or not.
Node u has a position list called plist to store the intruders’ positions. For each position
p in plist, u has four kinds of conditions: 1). u is activated and the intruder is within u′s
sensing range. In this case, sensor u predicts the intruder’s next possible position f , if f
is out of sensor u′s sensing range, sensor u calculates its delay time dd and add it to delay
time list ddlist1, else, the function returns since node u must keep active to monitor this
intruder. 2). sensor u is not activated, and the intruder is within u′s sensing range, and the
coverage degree ≤ ks, then sensor u calculates a delay time da, after time da, sensor u is
activated, then return. 3). u is activated but the intruder is out of u′s sensing range, if u
is not a coordinator, then sensor u calculates a delay time dd and add it to the delay time
list ddlist1. 4). sensor u is not activated and the intruder is out of u′s sensing range. In
this case, sensor u predicts the intruder’s next possible position f , if f is within sensor u′s
sensing range, sensor u calculates its delay time da. After time da, sensor u will be activated,
then return.
If sensor u is not needed to be deactivated, the delay time list ddlist1 must be empty.
Otherwise sensor u finds the maximal delay time Tdelay from ddlist1, after this time, u will
be deactivated.
3.5.3 Data Report to Base Station
When there are intruders within node u′s sensing range, and u is activated, u will periodically
send the intruders’ positions to the base station. For multiple intruders algorithm, we assume
each sensor can know every intruder’s identification and therefore, a global ID identifying
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Algorithm 6 Intruders tracking
1: get-intruders-position(plist)
2: for all p ∈ plist do
3: if ‖p, u‖ ≤ Rs && -is-sensing then
4: get-future-position(f)





10: else if ‖p, u‖ ≤ Rs && !-is-sensing && check-coverage() then
11: get-activation-delay(da)
12: after da, wake up
13: send packets to every neighbor v, v ∈ neiborlist
14: -is-sensing = true
15: return




20: if ‖f, u‖ ≤ Rs then
21: get-activation-delay(da)
22: after da, wakeup
23: send packets to every neighbor v, v ∈ neiborlist





29: if ddlist1 not empty then
30: find the maximal Tdelay ∈ ddlist1
31: after Tdelay , go to sleep
32: send packets to every neighbor v, v ∈ neiborlist
33: -is-sensing = false
34: end if
35: return
an intruder is added to the packet. Note that, this assumption is reasonable since once one
intruder enters the network, at least one sensor can detect and identify this intrusion. This
information is sent back to the base station through communication backbones and other
noncoordinator sensors, therefore, the whole network can identify this intruder and attach
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an ID to it.
3.6 Environment Setting and Results
We simulate our scheme in the NS2 network simulator using CMU wireless extensions. We
use a 750m ∗ 750m simulation network with 120 nodes. Nodes in our simulations use radios
with a 2Mbps bandwidth and 250 meters nominal radio range, and 50 meters sensing range.
Twenty nodes send and receive traffic. Each of these nodes send a CBR flow to another
node. and each CBR flow sends 128 byte packets.
All the sensor nodes never move except the intruders. Source and destination at all times
so they send and receive packets at higher throughput. However, they do not participate in
coordinator elections. The ID of the base station is set to 5. The 120th node is set to be
the intruder and active at all times for single intruder tracking simulation, while the 197th
to 120th nodes are set to be intruders for multiple intruders tracking simulation. As Fig. 3.6
shows, the coordinators rotate during a 600 second simulation.
3.6.1 Path Tracking Results
As shown in Fig. 3.7, the base station receives the intruder’s positions when it moves with a
coverage degree 2. Actually, the intruder moves from (746, 735) to (236, 157) to (189, 510).
When it arrives at the destination, it will stop 60 seconds and moves on. So there are more
points at the area where it stops.
3.6.2 Energy Comparison
The main purpose of our on-demand coverage problem is to provide energy efficient QoS
coverage. Here we present two baselines for our comparison: Virtual Patrol (Gui and Mo-
hapatra, 2005) and CCP (Xing et al., 2005).
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Figure 3.6: Communication Backbone Based on SPAN
X










Figure 3.7: Intruder Tracking
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Virtual Patrol
Virtual Patrol (Gui and Mohapatra, 2005) is another on-demand coverage algorithm. As
shown in Fig 3.8, the main idea is to activate all the nodes along the single intruder moving
path and report data to the base station during different duties. But they did not consider
the communication connectivity. Also, when the intruder moves out of the activated nodes,
these nodes will still remain active.
We make some improvements for this algorithm. Firstly, we add the communication
backbones using SPAN, secondly, we deactivate the nodes when the intruder moves out of
their sensing ranges.
CCP
As introduced in Section 3, CCP (Xing et al., 2005) is another algorithm considering both
the connectivity and coverage for wireless sensor networks. CCP is designed for general
applications to cover the full deployed area. Our algorithm is only interested in the area
where the intruder presents, and therefore is a partial coverage algorithm. Naturally our
algorithm can save more energy, as shown in Fig. 3.9.
As we can see, the remain energy of our algorithm is higher with coverage degree MSR
1. When MSR is 6, there are not so much difference since our algorithm activates all the
nodes which can cover the intruder. The original VP and improved VP have not much
difference. Because the wakened nodes do not need to send packets to the base station,
while the communication energy consumption play a huge role in wireless sensor networks.
3.6.3 Mean Delay Time until Detection
Mean delay time is one QoS evaluation metric for energy-efficient QoS coverage scheme. As
we can see, when the intruder moves out of the current scope of the sensing nodes, and
the new nodes need some random time to be activated based on the prediction model. The
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Figure 3.8: Virtual Patrol Algorithm
Coverage Degree




























Figure 3.9: Energy Comparison with Virtual Patrol and CCP
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definition of mean delay time until detection is the time span from the intruder moves out
of one node u′s sensing scope to the nearest sensor v which will be activated and ready to
sense the intruder. This metric is critical since if this delay is too long, we may lose the
track of the intruder. We run 3 simulation scenarios with single intruder and 4 intruders at
the speed of 20m/s. In this case, we exclude the scenarios that a node is assigned a delay
time to be activated, however, the intruder does NOT actually move into its sensing range.
Because in the case, this node goes back to sleep in stead of being activated.
Fig. 3.10 shows the average delay time at different simulation scenarios. As we can see,
at the same condition, in multiple intruders scenario, the sensors have smaller mean delay
time. The reason is that when one intruder i1 runs out of a sensor u
′s scope and is moving
toward to the sensor v, while another intruder i2 already run into the sensor v
′s sensing
scope and activates v. This feature is critical in battle field when a sensor network needs to




























Figure 3.10: Mean Delay Time (S) at different scenarios. Where we have 4 intruders and
each intruder has the same speed 20m/s. The single intruder also runs at this speed.
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3.6.4 Responsive Time
Responsive time is the other QoS evaluation metric for energy-efficient QoS coverage scheme.
It is because in several applications, such as battlefield, energy efficient is not a critical
concern while the responsive time between an intruder is detected and the base station
receives the intruder’s position is more important. In our algorithm, we take the average of
all the responsive time obtained from all the nodes which detects the intruders. Fig. 3.11
shows the responsive time v.s. the coverage degree for single intruder and multiple intruders
at different scenarios 600mm, 750mm and 1000mm. As we can see that with the increase of
coverage degree and decrease of the simulation area, the average responsive time increases. It
is reasonable because a smaller area means a dense sensors deployment and quick information
transfer. The average responsive time of multiple intruders detection is a little smaller than
that of single intruder detection. That is because in multiple intruders detection, more
sensors are involved in intruders detection, which enables a faster information transfer path,


























Figure 3.11: Responsive Time (S) at different scenarios. Where we have 4 intruders and
each intruder has the same speed 20m/s. The single intruder also runs at this speed.
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3.6.5 Probability of Detection
Probability of Detection is the other QoS evaluation metric for energy-efficient QoS coverage
scheme. Here we present an evaluation model that describes the probability of an intruder
can be detected by the k sensor nodes when the intruder moves out of the scope of current
k sensor nodes. We map the intruder detection problem to a line-set intersection problem.
We use tools from Integral Geometry and Geometric Probability to analytically evaluate
this probability of detecting the intruder moving at a random direction to the scope of the
next nodes which are eligible to be activated but only k nodes are activated, where k is the
desired coverage degree. A more detail presentation can refer to (Lazos et al., 2007).
In this model, we assume the trajectories of the mobile intruder are straight lines, with all
the trajectories crossing the next scope being equiprobable. Although such an assumption
constraints the space of all possible trajectories, our assumption gives a low bound of detec-
tion probability. Given any arbitrary entry and exit point in the next scope, moving on a
straight line minimizes the length of the trajectory of the target within the next scope (mini-
mizes the time that the intruder can be detected). Hence, the intruder detection probability
assuming line trajectories is the worst case probability compared to the detection of any
other possible trajectory. The worst case analysis allows us to compute network parameters
such as sensor density and length of the perimeters of the sensing areas, so that intruder
detection is guaranteed with a minimum probability.
The problem of mobile intruder detection under stochastic deployment can be mapped
to a line-set intersection problem in the following way. Let the next scope be mapped to
a bounded set S0, defined as a collection of points in the plane with perimeter length L0.
Let the sensing area of sensor si be mapped to a bounded set si with perimeter length Li.
Let the trajectory of the intruder X be mapped to a straight line A(ξ, θ) in the plane, with
parameters ξ and θ be the shortest distance of A to the origin of a coordinate system, and
θ be the angle of the line perpendicular to A with respect to the x axis. Then, the mobile
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intruder detection problem for stochastic sensor network is equivalent to the following line-set
intersection problem.
Line-set intersection problem: Given a bounded set S0 of perimeter length L0 and N
sets Si of perimeter length Li, randomly and independently placed inside S0, compute the
probability PD(k) that a random line A intersecting S0, also intersects at least k out of the
N sets Si, i = 1 · · ·N , where k is the coverage degree.
Table 3.1 summarizes the mapping from the mobile intruder detection problem to the line-
set intersection problem. Let A0 be a bounded next scope of perimeter length L0 monitored
by N sensors randomly deployed within A0, with sensor si, i = 1 · · ·N having a sensing area
of perimeter length Li. The probability PD(k) that at least k ≥ 1 sensors detect an intruder
X moving on a random straight line trajectory is given by:














(1 − qz̄n(v)) (3.5)





w-tuples zj of vector [1, · · · , N ]. The z̄j denotes the complement
Table 3.1: Mapping the mobile intruder detection problem to the line-set intersection prob-
lem
Mobile Intruder Detection ↔ Line-set Intersection
Number of sensors N ↔ Number of sets N
Next activated scope ↔ Set S0
Sensing area Ai of perimeter Li ↔ Set Si of perimeter Li
Random sensor deployment ↔ Random set placement
Trajectory of intruder X ↔ Random line l crossing S0
Probability of intruder ↔ Probability of l
detection by Ks sensors PD(k) intersecting Ks sets
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(N-w)-tuples of zj with respect to vector [1, · · · , N ], and qi is given by qi = Li/L0.
We now compute the probability P (zj) that a line A intersects exactly k sets denoted by
the k-tuple zj . Since the sets Ai are randomly and independently deployed, the probability
of the intersection of events becomes equal to the product of the probability of the individual
events.









(1 − qz̄j(v)) (3.6)
where z̄j denotes the complement of zj . To compute the probability of a random line











(1 − qz̄j(v)) (3.7)
Therefore PD(k) can be expressed by:





In Fig. 3.12, we show PD(k) as a function of the coverage degree k changing from 1 to 6.
The simulation scenario is 600m∗600m. We observe that with the increasing of the coverage
degree k, the probability is decreasing. We can select a k such that the PD(k) can be above
a threshold, i.e., if PD(k) ≥ 95%, the coverage degree k can not be larger than 4. We also
show the probability P (zj) of the intruder detected by exact k sensors as a function of the
coverage degree k sensor nodes in Fig. 3.13. As we can see, to gain an optimal detection
probability, the coverage degree is chosen as 8.
56
k ( Coverage Degree )












Figure 3.12: Probability of detection PD(k) for N = 100.
k coverage degree












Figure 3.13: Probability of detection P (ZN,k) for N = 100.
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we designed on-demand intruders tracking algorithms using modified SPAN
algorithm and CCP protocol. Initial sleeping nodes were activated to build backbones. As
the intruders moved, nearby nodes were activated and sent intruders’ positions information
to the base station. When the intruders moved away, past nodes went to sleep again to save
energy and future nodes were activated using the linear prediction model to estimate the
intruders’ future positions. Some QoS evaluation metrics in term of energy consumption,
mean delay time until detection, responsive time and probability detection were introduced
to measure our algorithms. Results showed that our algorithm is energy efficient compared
with other on-demand algorithms such as VP and CCP. Also, in the mean delay time until
detection and responsive time, our algorithm validated that sensor networks are more efficient
to detect the enemy in term of lower delay time and quicker responsive time when sensor
networks are used to detect huge amount of intruders. For the probability of detection, our








Information security is also a key QoS evaluation metric for the wireless sensor networks. It
is because at some critical applications, such as battlefield, sensor nodes are captured and
information channels can be eavesdropped easily. When these situation happen, wireless
sensor networks must be robust enough to continue providing reliable service. This chapter
presents a key establishment scheme for providing QoS to wireless sensor networks.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the architecture and properties
of LGKE scheme in detail. The QoS analysis and quantitative metrics are given to evaluate
LGKE scheme in Section 4.3. We summarize the chapter in Section 4.4.
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4.2 The LGKE Scheme
As commonly adopted, we assume the base station is globally trusted and powerful in this
study. We introduce the following notations.
Cluster head : A group head that acts as an information switch between the nodes in
a group and the base station. To be consistent with the terms in the literature such as
(Simplot-Ryl et al., 2005), we will use cluster head throughout this chapter. A non-cluster-
head node communicates with the base station by sending messages to a cluster head first
and the cluster head forwards them to the base station. Cluster heads are illustrated in Fig.
4.1. We will treat the number of cluster head as a smoothing parameter and find out the
optimal value in the later section.
Agent : A sensor node which acts as an information switch between a node and the nodes
in its neighboring group. A node communicates with the nodes in its neighboring group via
an agent. As illustrated in Fig. 4.2, nodes nx and ny are the agents of nodes ni and nj
respectively.
Neighboring groups: If two groups are neighbors in terms of geographic location, we define
them as neighboring groups. As shown in Fig. 4.1, each group has 8 neighboring groups.
The neighbors of G22 are G11, G12, G13, G21, G23, G31, G32, and G33.
Non-neighboring groups: If two groups are not adjacent in terms of geographic location,
we call them non-neighboring groups. As shown in Fig. 4.3, groups Gu and Gw, Gp and Gq
are non-neighboring groups.
Scalability Percentage: The ratio of the new sensor nodes to the original network size.
Preloaded key : The keys are stored in each node before deployment and are used within
the same group.
Path key : The keys are randomly generated and are used to communicate with the nodes
in neighboring groups.





Figure 4.1: An illustration of neighboring groups. The neighboring groups of G22 are its
geographic neighbors: G11, G12, G13, G21, G23, G31, G32, and G33. While in Fig. 4.3,
groups Gu and Gw, Gp and Gq are non-neighboring groups.
G u G v
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Figure 4.2: The path key establishment between neighboring groups through 3 agents. ni in
Gu and nj in Gv will randomly choose agents nx and ny as the intermediate nodes; then the
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Figure 4.3: The architecture of the LGKE scheme. The left figure is a traditional flat sensor
network without layers. The right one is the architecture of a two-layer sensor network. In
the two-layer network, a logical top layer is composed of the base station and the cluster
heads while a logical lower layer consists of other sensor nodes which are divided into groups.
non-neighboring groups.
4.2.1 The Scheme Architecture
We define the WSN topology for the LGKE scheme as shown in Fig. 4.3, which differs from
traditional flat networks. In a flat network, all nodes are identical and their architecture
depends merely on the geographic deployment. Although simple for small networks, this
network architecture suffers from scalability. For example, adding a new node needs to
inform the whole network, which involves in large communication energy consumption and
is infeasible for the WSN because of its intrinsic resource limitation.
To overcome this scalability problem, the LGKE scheme adopts a two-layer architecture:
a logic top layer that is composed of the base station and the cluster heads and a logic
lower layer that consists of the non-cluster-head nodes. This architecture coincides with the
scale free network model (Barabási and Albert, 1999) that there is a high probability that
a node links to a vertex that has already a large number of connections. It means that for
each communication unit, or group, there will be one or two nodes which act as switches
aggregating and forwarding information with other groups.
Also, in practice, the sensor nodes in a WSN are usually deployed in groups with hier-
archial architectures (Du et al., 2004a; Karlof and Wagner, 2003). Therefore, the two-layer
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group-based LGKE architecture is reasonable and practical for the large scale network. As
shown in Fig. 4.3, each group contains three nodes acting as cluster heads communicating
with the base station and the other cluster heads. If two groups are neighbors, the secured
inter-group communication is via path keys while the secured intra-group communication is
via pair-wise key establishment since unique pair-wise keys have perfect resilience against
node captures. If two groups are not neighbors, the sensors will communicate via the cluster
heads and the base station. The details of the layered topology are described as follows.
4.2.2 The Top Layer
In the top layer, we adopt and extend the EBS technique to ensure the secure communication
between the base station and the cluster heads (Eltoweissy et al., 2004). The EBS group keys
management method is based on a combinatorial formulation and is defined as a collection
Γ of subsets of the set of cluster heads. The elements of each subset A ∈ Γ are the cluster
heads that have a key. For simplicity, we denote A to both the key and the corresponding
subset. We also assume that, in addition to the administrative keys corresponding to the
subsets in Γ, the base station has a session key known to all cluster heads, and a personal
key known only to each cluster head (and the base station). The session key is clearly needed
for multi-casting encrypted data messages to all cluster heads. Personal keys are used for
cluster head authentication and for uni-casting initialization information when an individual
cluster head joins a multi-cast group.
We use EBS(n, k, m) to denote an EBS of dimension (n, k, m), where n is the number
of the cluster heads of the top layer system, k is the number of keys stored by each cluster
head, and m is the number of keys for the global key set not stored in one subset. n, k and
m are positive integers, and 1 < k, m < n. We denote Ai as the key known by each of the
cluster heads and the corresponding subset consisting of the cluster heads knowing the key
Ai. Γ is the collection of subsets Ai. The i
th cluster head only knows k keys, and there are
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m keys known by other cluster heads except the ith cluster head. An example is given to
demonstrate how to build the EBS and to assign the keys as follows.
• Construct an EBS system
We illustrate the construction of an EBS system as follows. For a total 10 cluster heads
system, the optimal value of k is ⌊log2 10⌋ (Eltoweissy et al., 2004), which is 3; m is selected










≥ 10. As shown in Fig. 4.4, in each column, we have 3
(corresponding to k) 1s and 2 (corresponding to m) 0s. We can see that subset A1 contains
cluster heads {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}, which means in row 1 the items at columns {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}
are 1s, and the cluster heads {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} know the key A1. Consequently, A2 contains
cluster heads {2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10}, A3 contains cluster heads {1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10}, A4 contains cluster
heads {1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9}, A5 contains cluster heads {1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8}. And the collection set Γ =
A1, A2, A3, A4, A5. Therefore, we have:
{1 · · ·10} − {1} = A1 ∪ A2
{1 · · ·10} − {2} = A1 ∪ A3
{1 · · ·10} − {3} = A1 ∪ A4
{1 · · ·10} − {4} = A1 ∪ A5
{1 · · ·10} − {5} = A2 ∪ A3 (4.1)
{1 · · ·10} − {6} = A2 ∪ A4
{1 · · ·10} − {7} = A2 ∪ A5
{1 · · ·10} − {8} = A3 ∪ A4
{1 · · ·10} − {9} = A3 ∪ A5
{1 · · ·10} − {10} = A4 ∪ A5












0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Col
Figure 4.4: An EBS construction matrix for k = 3 and m = 2. There are three ones and
two zeros in each column.
We can easily verify that cluster head 1 knows the keys A3, A4, A5 (k = 3 keys), and
does not know keys A1, A2 (m = 2 keys). Based on the property of EBS, we can use this
mechanism to rebuild the secure communication when one cluster head, e.g. 1 is captured.
Cluster head 1 only knows keys A3, A4, and A5. So, these keys need to be changed and two
messages containing new values can be encrypted by keys A1 and A2 respectively and be
sent out. Each message contains four subparts: 1) a new session key, 2) replacement key A′3
encrypted by the former A3 key, 3) replacement key A
′
4 encrypted by the former A4 key, and
4) replacement key A′5 encrypted by the former A5 key. It can be easily verified that the two
messages can ensure the remaining cluster heads to communicate securely, and cluster head
1 cannot decipher the messages since it does not know A2.
When an arbitrary cluster head departures or is captured, the EBS can be constructed
in a similar way through EBS(n, k, m). The base station can send m messages encrypted by
A1, A2,· · · , Am respectively with
⋃m
i=1 Ai = {1, · · · , n} − {t}, and the ith message contains
the new session key and new personal keys encrypted by their former ones to ensure that
the information can be deciphered by the corresponding cluster heads.
• Deployment Methods
There are many methods and models to deploy sensor networks (Liu et al., 2005; Zhou
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et al., 2005). For example, an airplane can scatter the nodes over the battlefield. Once the
sensor nodes are deployed, we assume they are static. And after being deployed, each node
will send a message to the base station containing its position; the base station will calculate
the distance between the node and itself. As shown in Fig. 4.3, the base station determines
the cluster heads in each group and communicates with them via the EBS scheme.
4.2.3 The Low Layer
• Key Establishment
Preloaded key establishment: A unique pairwise key is preloaded for every intra-
group sensor pair. A standard group size is selected to be γ = 100 as the same number is
taken in (Du et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2005; Chan and Perrig, 2005; Liu and Ning, 2003a),
such that each sensor stores 99 keys. If the key size is 64 bits, each sensor requires 792 bytes.
For sensor nodes as Mica2 Mote sensors designed by Berkeley that have 4KB SRAM (Pottie
and Kaiser, 2000), the memory usage is less than 20%. Also, we can halve the memory
requirement using the method in (Chan and Perrig, 2005) such that less than 10% memory
usage for keys storage is enough to ensure that any pair of sensors within the intra-group
share a unique preloaded key.
Path key establishment: As shown in Fig. 4.2, the number of agent t is arbitrarily
selected as 3, which means group Gu has 3 nodes who can directly communicate with group
Gv via keys encryption. And other nodes in group Gu have to communicate with the nodes
in group Gv via the three agents in Gu. The number of agents per group is related to the
group size and preloaded keys and its calculation will be discussed in the next section.
More generally, each sensor node holds m path keys, each group can has t = ⌈mγ
8
⌉ agents
in its neighboring group. For example, if node ni in Gu wants to establish the key agreement
with nj in Gv, it will follow the following steps:
1. ni, nj will randomly choose agents nx and ny as the communication intermediary;
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2. ni randomly generates a key Ki,j and sends to nx encrypted with the pairwise key Ki,x
shared with nx;
3. nx decrypts the received packet containing Ki,j by using the pairwise key Ki,x, and re-
encrypts the packet with the key Kx,y shared with ny, and sends it to ny;
4. ny decrypts the packet and re-encrypts it with the key Ky,j, and sends it to nj ;
5. nj deciphers the packet using Ky,j , and stores the path key Ki,j corresponding to ny.
Inter-non-neighboring-group key establishment: If two groups are not neighbors
as shown in the example in Fig. 4.5. For example, Gu and Gw are non-neighboring groups;
Gp and Gq are non-neighboring groups; and Gu and Gv, Gu and Gp are neighboring groups.
If a sensor node ni in Gu wants to communicate with nt in Gw, a possible solution is to
build a path via the agents in groups Gu, Gp, Gk and finally reach to Gw. However, this
method involves in too many communication hops between non-cluster head sensor nodes
and therefore consumes too much energy. It is unwise in a energy limited sensor network.
Here we present an alternative scheme in which the sensor node ni can reach to nt via
the cluster heads and base station, as shown in Fig. 4.5. This multi-hop between cluster
heads and the base station ensures their communication will consume much less energy than
multi-hop communication between non-cluster heads sensor nodes.
Also, since the communication between the sensor nodes and the cluster heads, say, ni and
cx, nt and cy, is within the same group, it involves in the local communication. Hence, this
scheme decreases the communication energy wasted in multi-hop communications. Moreover,
the communication between the cluster heads and the base station is secure because the
message is encrypted with the pairwise key through EBS.
The key agreement setup is similar with the steps in neighboring-group key agreement
setup and is shown in Fig. 4.5.














Figure 4.5: Inter-non-neighboring-group key establishment between non-neighboring groups.
ni in Gu and nt in Gw will randomly choose cluster heads cx and cy as the intermediate nodes;
then the communication key Ki,t between ni and nj can be established through cx, cn, the
base station, cm and cy.
2. ni randomly generates a key Ki,t and sends to cx encrypted with the pairwise key Ki,x
shared with cx;
3. cx decrypts the received packet containing Ki,t by using the pairwise key Ki,x, and re-
encrypts the packet with the key Kx,n shared with some cluster head cn in some inter-
mediate group Gn which is nearer to the base station than Group Gu. We can choose
more than one group as the intermediate groups according to the locations and groups
and base station.
4. cn decrypts the received packet containing Ki,t by using the personal key Kx,n, and re-
encrypts the packet with the key Kn,b shared with the base station, and sends it to the
base station;
5. The base station decrypts the packet and re-encrypts it with the key Kb,m, and sends it
to the cluster head cm in the intermediate group Gm;
6. The cluster head cm decrypts the packet and re-encrypts it with the personal key Km,y,
and sends it to cy;
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7. The cluster head cy decrypts the packet and re-encrypts it with the key Ky,t, and sends
it to nt;
8. nt deciphers the packet using the pairwise key Ky,j, and stores the path key Ki,t corre-
sponding to the cluster head cy.
For a large scale senor network, it is not unusual to communicate between two non-
neighboring groups. For example, if a query requested in one group may need to know
the sensing information of its non-neighboring groups, a communication path will be built
to meet this query. Traditional optimal path search methods like Bellman-Ford algorithm,
involve many communications within the whole network and hence consume much energy,
which increases the possibility of being impersonated. While the communication via the base
station decreases this possibility since the base station is safe and resource rich as assumed,
and the selection of the optimal path to the base station is confined in a subnet containing
the base station only.
4.2.4 Scalability Analysis
The LGKE architecture is more scalable than the flat distributed architecture and the EBS
key establishment mechanism ensures an easy way to add/delete a group.
• Add a Group
To add a group to a WSN, we need to add 3 cluster heads since each group contains 3
cluster heads. We propose two algorithms to add a new cluster head to the EBS system.
The first algorithm is to let the base station randomly generates a new key, and lets all the
existing cluster heads (including the new one) know the new key. We can add a new bottom
row to the matrix, as shown in the left figure of Fig. 4.6, and place one 1 in each of the
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Figure 4.6: An illustration of adding a cluster head. The main difference is that the first
algorithm (the left) appends an all-1 row to the matrix while the second one (the right)
appends an all-0 row. The new added column must be different from the existed columns
but have same numbers of ones and zeros.
0 in the last row. Placing one 1 in each of the existing columns means letting existing users
know the new key. This method corresponds to an EBS(n + 1, k + 1, m) system, and k + 1
keys are known to each cluster head, and m packets are needed for re-keying operations.
The other two cluster heads can be added similarly.
The second algorithm is to add a new bottom row to the matrix and to place one 0
in each of the existing columns. Then add a new column that it also has k 1’s, but with
one 1 in the last row, as shown in the right figure of Fig. 4.6. Placing a 0 in each of
these columns corresponds to not giving the new key to any of the existing users. Placing
one 0 in each of these columns corresponds to no need for each existing cluster head to
store the new generated key. That is, the method is to extend the existing EBS system to
EBS(n + 1, k, m + 1). k keys are known to each cluster head and m + 1 packets are needed
for re-keying operations.
There is a tradeoff in the memory usage and the communication overhead between the
above two algorithms on the top layer when adding or deleting groups. The first algorithm
(add ones in the bottom row) requires more memory space for the cluster heads, since when
a new cluster head joins in, a new key is needed to store in all the cluster heads, but it does
not increase the re-keying operations. Therefore, compared to the second algorithm, the fist
one needs more memory space but less communication overhead. An appropriate algorithm
to balance the memory usage and the communication overhead should be considered for the
70
base station. Here we choose the algorithm according to the scalability percentage. For
example, for a network with 10, 000 sensor nodes and being divided into 100 groups with
100 nodes per group, we need large scalability percentage 100%, which means to add 100
more groups. The first algorithm needs another 300 keys while the second one needs another
300 re-keying operations. Considering the energy consumption in re-keying operations, we
prefer the first method to extend the network.
• Delete a Group
When a group is evicted, the base station can re-key and notify the system by m multi-
cast packets as previously indicated. Since one group contains 3 cluster heads, we assume
the 3 cluster heads are evicted one by one when a group is evicted. It is doable because the
eviction of sensor nodes in a group should be slower than the communication between the
base station and the sensor nodes, and there must be some interval between the evictions of
two cluster heads. However, by deleting a group, an EBS(n, k, m) may reduce the number
of keys stored in each node or the number of packets needed for re-keying.
In fact, after some evictions and additions, the evolved EBS system could be far from
the optimal and the base station may re-allocate the keys for the top layer, if necessary. For
example, for the above network, in the top layer of an EBS system, the total number of






> Ne, say, m = 4, such that the top layer can be denoted as EBS(300, 9, 4).
When adding 100 groups and deleting 50 groups, the EBS system contains 450 cluster heads
and 309 keys and needs 4 re-keying operations, which is far beyond the optimum. The base
station can re-allocate the keys distribution to EBS(450, 10, 4) to spare more memory for
the cluster heads.
4.2.5 Properties of LGKE
The LGKE scheme has the following properties in terms of QoS evaluation:
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Resilience against impersonation: Since all the packets between the sender and the re-
ceiver are encrypted and deciphered by the shared pairwise key, these packets can not be
deciphered or impersonated by the attackers, such as Sybil attack(Karlof and Wagner, 2003).
Less communication overhead : All the communications are within the local distance.
Therefore, the energy consumption due to the communication overhead is less than the
consumptions in other schemes, such as GKE and PIKE, which are all involved in network-
wide communications and thus consume more energy.
Resistance against group capture: LGKE can resist the group capture. Once a group is
captured, the base station will exclude the cluster heads from the top layer system through
EBS.
Dynamic scalability : If x groups want to join in the sensor network, the base station
runs the ADD algorithm x × 3 times, since each group contains 3 cluster heads. This
property is a distinct advantage over other schemes. For instance, for a 10, 000 sensor nodes
network, in a flat EBS scheme EBS(10000, 14, 6) in (Eltoweissy et al., 2004), adding 100
nodes makes not much difference, and the scalability percentage is only 100
10000
= 1%. But
in LGKE, since the network is divided into groups, the Ne is 3 × 100 = 300, k can be





> Ne, e.g. m = 4, the system is
hence denoted as EBS(300, 9, 4), and the scalability percentage is 100∗3
300
= 100%. While the
overhead of running the ADD algorithm can be ignored since algorithm is executed in the
base station, which is powerful and energy-unlimited. While other schemes, such as Random
pairwise key scheme (Chan et al., 2003), location-based random pairwise key schemes Du
et al. (2003); Liu and Ning (2003a), GKE (Zhou et al., 2005, 2006)and PIKE (Chan and
Perrig, 2005), assume the network is static after being deployed which either ignore the
scalability issue or have low scalability percentage.
Denial of Service(DoS) Resistance: The intermediate nodes may come across the DoS
attack during the establishment of the path key in the low layers. Since the intermediate
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agents are randomly chosen, and the messages routed from ni to nj may have more than one
braided path, which provides probabilistic protection against DoS attack.
Resistance against cluster heads capture: The EBS scheme is able to reconstruct the top
layer when the cluster heads are compromised. Even when more than one cluster head are
captured, the EBS scheme can reconstruct the top layer.
4.3 QoS Evaluation
We evaluate the QoS performance of the LGKE scheme based on two metrics: the surviv-
ability and the resource consumption. The measure of survivability is defined to determine
the resilience, resistance and robustness against the attackers, and the resource consumption
focuses on the communication overhead and memory usage.
4.3.1 Survivability
Various survivability definitions have been proposed in different disciplines, such as the
definition from Ellison et al. (1997), which emphasizes the time-varying behavior of the
system after a failure or an attack. Knight Knight et al. (2000) introduces a general definition
of survivability for critical information systems: A survivability specification is a four-tuple,
(E; R; P; M) where: E is a statement of the assumed operating environment for the system,
R is a set of specifications each of which is a complete statement of a tolerable form of service
that the system must provide, P is a probability mass function across the set of specifications,
and M is a finite state machine.
For sensor networks which have many characteristics that make them more vulnerable
to attacks than conventional computing equipments, we define two QoS criteria to represent
desirable characteristics of the LGKE based on the definition of Knight et al. (2000); Li
and Yang (2006): resilience and robustness. Resilience is defined as one of the following:
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(i) the probability that at least a link is compromised when an adversary captures a node,
(ii) number of nodes whose security credential is compromised when an adversary captures
a node, or (iii) number of sensor nodes required to be captured to compromise the whole
network. Robustness considers the probability that two (or more) sensor nodes store the
same key or keying material that can be used to establish pair-wise keys.
4.3.2 Quantitative QoS Metrics
In order to compare the QoS performance of the LGKE scheme with other schemes, we use
the following system settings in the quantitative analysis. The size of the sensor network N
ranges from 10,000 to 50,000, with 10,000 being the default value. The group size γ is set to
be 100 as other group-based schemes Chan et al. (2003); Du et al. (2003); Zhou et al. (2005).
Consequently, the number of groups g is equal to N/γ, varying from 100 to 500.
We evaluate the LGKE scheme in terms of its resilience and robustness against node
capture and attacks based on the definition above and formulate into two metrics: (1)
When x nodes are captured, what is the probability that at least one secure connection is
compromised? This QoS analysis shows the network’s resilience with x nodes are captured.
(2) When x nodes are captured, what is the probability of the actual two nodes share one
pairwise key? This QoS analysis shows the networks’s robustness against the x nodes’ being
captured. In our analysis, we assume that the attackers have no priori knowledge of the keys
carried by each sensor and therefore we model the attacker as compromising random nodes.
• Resilience
Let ni and nj be two un-compromised nodes. Let Li,j be the connection and Ki,j be the
shared key between them. Let Υ(Ki,j) be the event that Ki,j is a preloaded key, let Π(Ki,j)
be the event that Ki,j is a path key, and let Φ(Ki,j) be the event that Ki,j is an inter-non-
neighboring-group key. Let L̄i,j be the event that connection Li,j is compromised, and C(x)
74
be the event that x sensors have been compromised. According to the Bayes theorem, the
probability that L̄i,j has occurred given that x sensors have been compromised equals to the
probability of ni and nj are within the same group, plus the probability of ni and nj are
within neighboring groups, and plus the probability of ni and nj are within non-neighboring
groups, or alternatively,
Pr[L̄i,j|C(x)] = Pr[L̄i,j|C(x) ∧ Υ(Ki,j)] × Pr[Υ(Ki,j)]
+Pr[L̄i,j|C(x) ∧ Π(Ki,j)] × Pr[Π(Ki,j)]
+Pr[L̄i,j|C(x) ∧ Φ(Ki,j)] × Pr[Φ(Ki,j)] (4.2)
Since in LGKE preloaded pairwise keys are unique, the communication secured by a
preloaded key can not be compromised unless one of its endpoints is compromised(Zhou
et al., 2005, 2006; Chan and Perrig, 2005). Therefore, LGKE achieves perfect resilience
against node captures by Pr[L̄i,j|C(x) ∧ Υ(Ki,j)] × Pr[Υ(Ki,j)] = 0.
Since each group has 8 neighboring groups to communicate using path key and each group
has t = ⌈(mγ
8
)⌉ agents in every other neighboring group, where m is number of inter-group
pairwise keys each node stores, and γ is the group size, 100. Let α be the probability that









. Π1(Ki,j) is the event
of either ni or nj being the agent of the other group but not both; and Π2(Ki,j) is the event
of neither ni nor nj being agents. Therefore, we have:
Pr[Π1(Ki,j)] = 2α(1 − α)











is the probability of the agent used to send the path key Ki,j which is
not compromised when ni and nj are not compromised but x nodes being compromised.
Then Pr[L̄i,j|C(x)∧Π1(Ki,j)] can be obtained as 1−p1. Similarly, we can get Pr[L̄i,j|C(x)∧
75
Π2(Ki,j)], and the two formulations are as follows:
Pr[L̄i,j|C(x) ∧ Π1(Ki,j)] =
x
N − 2









So, the resilience for the inter-neighboring-group communication can be obtained as:
Pr[L̄i,j|C(x) ∧ Π(Ki,j)] = Pr[L̄i,j|C(x) ∧ Π1(Ki,j)] × Pi1(Ki,j)
+ Pr[L̄i,j|C(x) ∧ Π2(Ki,j)] × Pi2(Ki,j)
= 2α(1 − α) x










where Pr[Π(Ki,j)] is the ratio of the number of path keys to the total number of keys among
all pairs of neighboring sensors.
For the inter-non-neighboring-group communication, Φ1(Ki,j) is the event of either ni or
nj being the cluster head but not both; and Φ2(Ki,j) is the event of neither ni nor nj being



































is the probability of the cluster head used to send the path key Ki,j which
is not compromised when ni and nj are not compromised but x nodes being compromised.
Then Pr[L̄i,j|C(x)∧Φ1(Ki,j)] can be obtained as 1−p2. Similarly, we can get Pr[L̄i,j|C(x)∧
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Φ2(Ki,j)], and the two formulations are as follows:





















where Pr[Φ(Ki,j)] is the ratio of the number of inter-non-neighboring-group keys to the
total number of keys among all pairs of non-neighboring sensors. Consequently, the final
expression of resilience is:


























































))) × Pr[Φ(Ki,j)] (4.8)
Fig. 4.7 shows the numeric resilience analysis, compared with the results of GKE and
PIKE. When 100 to 900 of 10, 000 nodes are compromised, the fraction of communication
is compromised. It can be noticed that in Du’s scheme (Du et al., 2003), when around 350
of 10,000 sensors are compromised, the resilience decreases dramatically. In contrast, the
algorithms (LGKE, GKE and PIKE) show graceful degradation of resilience (below 6%),
therefore attackers are unable to compromise a large fraction of other communication links
by compromising a small number of sensors. It also can be seen that LGKE scheme is better
than GKE and PIKE with regard to resilience because LGKE scheme considers not only the
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of the resilience of GKE, PIKE, and LGKE. LGKE has the best
QoS performance with the number of captured sensors increasing from 100 to 1000. The
network has 10,000 sensors, and each group contains 100 sensor nodes.
The quantitative formulation of robustness is the probability that at least one pair of
nodes stay connected when x nodes are captured, which shows the robustness of the sensor
network to provide information service when attacks occur. Let Li,j be the connection and
Ki,j be the shared key between arbitrarily selected ni and nj. Let S be the events set that
the connection Li,j of the nodes ni and nj is compromised given that x nodes are captured.
Specifically, let SΥ be the event that Li,j is compromised when Ki,j is a preloaded key, let
SΠ be the event that Li,j is compromised when Ki,j is a path key, and let SΦ be the event
that Li,j is compromised when Ki,j is a inter-non-neighboring-group key. Let C(x) be the
event that x nodes have been compromised in the network. We have the probability of at
least one connection exists as follows:
Pr[at least one connection exists|C(x)]
= 1 − Pr[all connections are compromised|C(x)] (4.9)
= 1 − Pr[SΥ ∩ SΠ ∩ SΦ|C(x)]
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Since events SΥ, SΠ, SΦ are mutually exclusive, therefore
Pr[SΥ ∩ SΠ ∩ SΦ|C(x)] = Pr[SΥ|C(x)] × Pr[SΠ|C(x)] × Pr[SΦ|C(x)] (4.10)
So the expression of robustness can be derived as
Pr[at least one connection exists|C(x)]
= 1 − Pr[SΥ|C(x)] × Pr[SΠ|C(x)] × Pr[SΦ|C(x)] (4.11)
As mentioned above, since preloaded pairwise keys are unique, the communication secured
by a preloaded key can not be compromised unless one of its endpoints is compromised.
















Pr[SΠ|C(x)] can be calculated using Eqs. 4.3 and 4.4, and Pr[SΦ|C(x)] can be calculated
using Eqs. 4.6 and 4.7. We have



























































The robustness approaches to 1, which means LGKE can always assure a secured communi-
cation path with x ≤ N − 2 nodes being captured.
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4.3.3 Memory Usage
The LGKE scheme needs low memory requirements. For a sensor network of N sensors, with
group size γ, LGKE requires each sensor to be preloaded with γ − 1 pairwise keys shared
with sensors within the same group and t = ⌈mγ
8
⌉ path keys shared with sensors that are
in the different groups, including k = ⌈log2 3g⌉ inter-non-neighboring-group keys especially
for the 3 cluster heads. t is the same as the number of agents per group. We also use
the method in (Chan and Perrig, 2005) to halve the memory requirement. Therefore, the
total memory overhead per sensor is (γ − 1)/2 + ⌈mγ
8
⌉ keys for non-cluster-head nodes, and




log2 3g⌉ for the cluster heads.
4.3.4 Communication Overhead
The communication overhead is defined as the average number of hops that a message has
to be transmitted in order to establish a key between any pair of neighboring sensors (Zhou
et al., 2005, 2006; Chan and Perrig, 2005).
Under the LGKE scheme, the selection of cluster heads is based on the geographical
characteristics. The top layer communication is between base station and the cluster heads.
The communication between neighboring groups is based on agents and the communication
between non-neighboring groups is based on cluster heads and base station.
• Path Key Communication Overhead
As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, ni in Gu wants to establish the key agreement with nj in
Gv, it will involve in messages from ni to nx, through ny to nj. Let h(np, nq) be the hop
distance between np and nq. The total hops from ni to nj can be expressed as: H(ni, nj) =
h(ni, nx) + h(nx, ny) + h(ny, nj). If HLGKE is the expected number of hops for path key
establishment in LGKE, the linearity of expectation leads to HLGKE = 2h̄LGKE + h̄′LGKE,
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where h̄LGKE is the expected hop distance between any two nodes within a group, and
h̄′LGKE is the expected hop distance between any two nodes from neighboring groups.
If two nodes are separated by physical distance λ̄, and the transmission radius is r for a
node and infinity for the base, we will need at least λ̄/r hops for sensor nodes, which can be
used as a lower bound for the average hop distance.
The expected physical distance between ni and nj is the expected distance between two
randomly picked points in a square of area a× a, which is known to be 0.52a (Ghosh, 1951).
Therefore, in LGKE, for ni to nx, and ny to nj , the expected distance is λ̄LGKE = 0.52a.
Let λ̄′LGKE be the expected distance between nx and ny. Since two neighboring groups
may have two adjacent methods: along an edge or at a corner, we can define that λ̄′L be the
expected distance between two random points picked randomly from neighboring squares
that are vertically (or horizontally) disposed (along an edge), and λ̄′N be the expected
distance between two random points picked from neighbors that are diagonally disposed (at
a corner). According to the Bayes theory, we have
λ̄′LGKE = Pr[
⊕
]λ̄′L + Pr[⊗]λ̄′N (4.14)
where Pr[
⊗
] is the probability that neighboring squares are horizontally, and Pr[
⊕
]) is the
probability that neighboring squares are diagonally disposed.
Since the expected distance between two random points in an a × 2a rectangle is 0.804a
(Ghosh, 1951), and these two points are from the same square or the different square with the
probability 0.5, we can use the linearity of expectation to obtain 0.804a = 0.5λ̄LGKE +0.5λ̄′
L
such that λ̄′L = 1.088a.
For λ̄′N, considering two random points in a 2a× 2a square, which consists of four a× a
squares. The expected distance between two random points in a 2a×2a square is the double
of 0.52, or 1.04a. The probability that these two points originate from the same a×a square
is 0.25. The probability is 0.5 that they come from two horizontally or vertically adjacent
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a × a squares and is 0.25 that they come from two diagonally disposed a × a squares. We





], ni needs to communicate with a neighbor nj from a vertically
adjacent square only when ni is within a distance r from the top edge of its cell. Similarly,
ni needs to communicate with a neighbor from a diagonally disposed square only when ni
is within a distance r from the corner, that is, inside the quarter circle area. Using the area














. Finally, the path key communication overhead can be expressed
as:














• Inter-non-neighboring-group Key Communication Overhead
As shown in Fig. 4.5, ni in Gu wants to establish the key agreement with nt in Gw, it
will involve in messages from ni to nt, through cx, cn, the base station, cm and cy. Similar to
the path key communication overhead analysis the total hops from ni to nt can be expressed
as: H(ni, nt) = h(ni, cx) + h(cx, cn) + h(cn, · · · ) + h(· · · , BS) + h(BS, · · · ) + h(· · · , cm) +
h(cm, cy) + h(cy, nj), where ”· · ·” means we do not know the exact number of hops from the
original group to the base station, or from the base station to the source group. A shortest
path selection algorithm can be used to determine the hops. If H ′LGKE is the expected
number of hops for inter-non-neighboring-group key establishment in LGKE, the linearity
of expectation leads to H ′LGKE = 2h̄LGKE + β ∗ h̄′′LGKE, where h̄′′LGKE is the expected hop
distance between the cluster heads, or from the cluster heads to the base station, β is the
expected hops between the intermediate cluster heads and the base station, or specifically,





as calculated in Section 4.3.4.
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For h̄′′LGKE, we can consider the communication between the cluster heads and the
base station as within a bigger group with the square size ã × ã, therefore, h̄′′LGKE can be
simplified to 0.52ã/r. The simulation result shows that the expected number of hops β is
6 when the number of sensor nodes equals to 50, 000 and the corresponding cluster heads
equals to 1, 500 (3 ∗ 50, 000/100) as shown in Fig. 4.8. Also, after carefully deployment of
the base station (Pan et al., 2005a), the coefficient β can be further smaller. Finally, the
inter-non-neighboring-group key communication overhead can be expressed as:









Fig. 4.8 shows the average number of hops to establish a path key in PIKE, GKE and
the lower layer of LGKE. The average hops to establish an inter-non-neighboring-group key
for the top layer in LGKE is also given. The network size varies from 10,000 to 50,000
Figure 4.8: Average number of hops v.s. network size using GKE, PIKE and LGKE. The
GKE, PIKE and LGKE (low layer) plots show the average number of hops to establish a
path key. The LGKE(top layer) plot shows the average number hops to establish an inter-
non-neighboring-group key. The network size varies from 10,000 to 50,000 with fixed group
size 100.
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with a fixed group size 100. It shows that LGKE outperforms GKE and PIKE with smaller
number of hops and hence lower communication overhead. It benefits from the novel layered
architecture of LGKE. We may notice that, in Du’s schemes (Du et al., 2003), communi-
cation between two key-space-sharing sensors only involve in local connectivity, therefore
the average number of hops required on a route connecting the two sensors is pretty small.
When Pr(local) = 0.3, the expected value of hops is about 2.2, which is smaller than that
of PIKE, GKE and LGKE.
Fig. 4.9 shows the average number of hops per path key with the cluster heads per
group changing from 1 to 10 in LGKE. It can be seen that the number of hops increases
with the increase of number of cluster heads. This is because more cluster heads lead higher
probability for the packets to be transmitted between the cluster heads. Considering both
survivability and the resource consumption, we choose the number of cluster head be three
instead of one or two even though one or two cluster heads result in the same average of
hops.
Figure 4.9: Average number of hops v.s. number of cluster heads per group. The average
number of hops to establish a path key and an inter-non-neighboring-group key are given




Establishing pairwise keys for sensors is one of the most challenging security issues for wire-
less sensor networks. It provides the QoS for confidential communications for some critical
applications. This chapter presents LGKE, a novel layered group-based key establishment
QoS scheme for wireless sensor networks. LGKE has a number of advantages over exist-
ing schemes in terms of QoS. First, it supports dynamic scalability for large scale networks
through its layered architecture and EBS techniques. Second, its hierarchical architecture
conforms to real world settings, making it suitable for a wide range of applications. Third,
LGKE is resilient against node capture attacks, due to the uniqueness of pairwise key estab-
lishment mechanism. Finally, LGKE involves only local communication to establish pairwise
keys which reduces communication overhead as well. The QoS analysis and the quantitative




Conclusion and Future Directions
As described in Chapter 1, wireless sensor networks are resource constrained, and vulnerable
to attacks. Some researches attempt to solve the energy efficient problems in WSN. Other
researches pay more attentions to address the security problems. In this dissertation, we have
focused on in finding a QoS provision for WSN considering both the energy efficient issues
and the security issues. In this chapter, we first summarize the finding for QoS provision in
terms of energy efficient routing, energy efficient coverage and key establishment schemes,
and then briefly present the direction for the future research.
5.1 Summary of Findings
In Chapter 2, we presented a energy-aware QoS routing protocol for sensor networks. We
built a model for a two-layered sensor network by using a deployment method. We then
derived a general linear programming formulation for the network lifetime maximization
problem. Finally we presented our heuristics algorithms to achieve optimal network lifetime
by finding the QoS paths. It is the first approach in literature to develop the hybrid energy-
efficient routing protocol while minimizing the communication energy consumption using the
nodes deployment knowledge.
86
In Chapter 3, we presented the energy-aware coverage and connectivity scheme for WSN.
In order to save energy and obtain better QoS performance, we developed a linear prediction
model to activate and deactivate sensor nodes in advance, we adopted dynamic coverage
configuration protocol to maintain coverage, and we used SPAN to build the communication
backbone. We also provided QoS evaluation metrics in term of energy consumption, mean
delay time until detection, and responsive time, and probability detection were introduced
to measure our algorithms. Our algorithm achieves better QoS performance in terms of the
mean delay time until detection and responsive time. Our algorithm validated that sensor
networks are more efficient to detect the enemy in term of lower delay time and quicker
responsive time when sensor networks are used to detect huge amount of intruders.
In Chapter 4, we proposed LGKE to ensure the secured communication between the
sensor nodes in a dynamic large scalable wireless sensor network. We used group-based
model to deploy the sensors, and preload unique pairwise keys for robust communication.
We extended the Exclusion Basic System (EBS) technique (Eltoweissy et al., 2004) to achieve
dynamic scalability. The QoS evaluation results show that LGKE is more resilient against
node capture attacks, more robust against communication compromised, and involves in less
communication overheads.
5.2 Future Directions
In Chapter 2, we assumed the sensor nodes are static and derived our heuristic algorithms
based on a centralized assumption. While it is impractical for the base station to make
and send the decisions for the huge amount of sensor nodes because it involves in heavy
communication overhead. Normally sensor nodes make decisions based on the information
from their neighbors. Therefore, a decentralized algorithm for every sensor to select the QoS
path is a possible research direction. Another interesting issue for QoS routing protocols
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is the consideration of node mobility. It is because the frequent update of the position of
the command node and the sensor nodes and the propagation of that information through
the network may excessively drain the energy of nodes. Other possible future research for
routing protocols includes the integration of sensor networks with IP-based networks (e.g.
Internet).
In Chapter 3, we used the linear prediction model and CCP to schedule sensor nodes
activated and deactivated to ensure energy saving and dynamic coverage. We assumed the
sensing area of the sensor nodes are circle and their radius are the same. However, in some
applications, the sensing radius are different. Furthermore, even the sensing area of sensor
nodes are irregular, for example, video sensors have cone sensing area. The customized
coverage schemes should be investigated for these applications.
In Chapter 4, we presented the Key Establishment scheme based on one channel. The
key establishment schemes for multiple channels available for sensor networks should be
investigated also. Another area is to explore stronger threat models. Finally, it is interesting
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